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ABSTRACT

Perhaps the purest form of citizen political expression is addressing
a government body directly during the public-comment period. Despite
its salutary civic benefits, the public-comment period faces escalating
threats, with local elected officials imposing rigid controls on speakers .
Disturbingly , these rules sometimes are enforced via arrest . The U.S.
Supreme Court recently confronted this scenario in Lozman v. City of
Riviera Beach, involving the arrest of a citizen-critic who refused to
stop using his city council's open-mic period to decry public corruption .
While narrowly fact-specific, the Court 's June 2018 resolution of the
case reaffirms the importance of protecting speakers at government
bodies against retaliation for disagreeable views. This Article surveys
recent instances in which speakers addressing government bodies were
silenced - at times, forcibly-and how courts address both facial and
as-applied challenges to restrictions on public comment . The Article
also examines the constitutionality of commercially available standardform policies increasingly adopted by local governments to restrict
"insulting" speech, "personal attacks ," and other citizen criticism . It
proposes taking the next logical step that the Lozman Court hesitated
to take -n amely, recognizing a framework to help courts assess all First
Amendment retaliation claims by speakers punished for noncompliance
with content- or viewpoint-based directives to refrain from speaking .
Ultimately, the Article concludes that the simple burden-shifting
analysis that the Court found applicable under Fane Lozman's unique
set of facts -in which it is the speaker 's burden to establish a prima
facie case of a speech-punitive cause -and-effect -i s in fact the
appropriate standard for all such retaliation claims , so that the
existence of an independent basis for arrest does not mechanistically
defeat a speaker's claim where a retaliatory motive is proven.
INTRODUCTION

"I found the video pretty chilling. I mean, the fellow is up there for
about fifteen seconds, and the next thing he knows, he 's being led off in
... handcuffs, speaking in a very calm voice the whole time. " 1

1.

Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138
S. Ct . 1945 (2018) (No. 17-21); see Jane Musgrave, U.S. Supreme Court
Chief Justice Calls Fane Lozman 's Arrest 'Chilling, ' PALM BEACH POST
(Feb . 28, 2018, 6:03 PM), https://www.mypalmb eachpost.com/n ews/
crime -law/ supreme-court-chief-j ustice-calls-fane-lozman-arrest-chilling/
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That 's how Chief Justic e John Rob erts describ ed a video2 depicting
F ane Lozman 's arrest for speaking out at a 2006 meeting of the city
council of Rivi era Beach , Florida .3 Lozman , "a Marin e turn ed multimillion aire inv entor turned thorn in th e side of Riviera Beach officials , "4
relish es "rattling city cages ." 5 For instanc e, th e "ind efatig able gadfly "6
and "relentless oppon ent of public corruption "7 scored a victory in 2013
before th e nation 's high court after Rivi era Beach imp ermissibly
classifi ed Lozma n 's floating hom e as a "vesse l" under a federal statute
and destroy ed it. 8
But th e images that Roberts found so "chilling " arose out of a
different clash betw een Lozman and his hom etown . This disput e
involv ed Lozman 's civil-rights claim und er 42 U.S .C. § 19839 that he

5AMmiBHaVolL1Fh0b6XLAO/ [htt ps://pe rma.cc /6 QMY-PYAF ] (describing
oral arg ument in the case).
2.

Scanshift , Activist Arrest ed at Riviera B each City Council Meeting, YouT UBE
(Sept. 15, 2009), https: //www.yo utube.com /watc h ?v=8 Dqpvh6 _ z0g
[http s://pe rma .cc/6F4N-HPA4].

3.

Musgrave , supra not e 1.

4.

Jane Mu sgra ve, Riviera Man Wins U.S. High Court Case, PALM BEACH
POST, Jan. 16, 2013, at lA.

5.

Jane Musgrave, Supreme Court Winner Tackling Riviera Again, PALM
BEACH PO ST, Sept. 1, 2014, at lA .

6.

Adam Lipta k, This 'Tenacious Underdog' Won His First Supreme Court
Case. Now He's Back., N.Y . TIMES (Dec . 4, 2017) , http s://www.nyt imes.
com/2017 / 12/ 04/ us/ politi cs/s upr eme-court-first- amendm ent-fr eedom-ofspeech-arrest. html [https://per ma.cc/ JCD7-N 3FS] .

7.

Robert Barnes, Justic es to See a Familiar Face in Battl e Over Speech Rights ,
WASH. POST, Feb . 26, 2018, at Al.

8.

Lozman v. City of Riviera Bea ch , 568 U.S. 115, 118-20 (2013).

9.

This statute provid es , in relevant part:
[e]very person who , und er color of any stat ut e, ordinance , regulation,
custom , or usage, of any Stat e or T erritory or th e Dist rict of Columbia,
subjects , or causes t o be subjected, any citizen of t he United States or
other person within the juri sd ict ion thereof to the depri vation of any
rights, privil eges, or immuniti es secur ed by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liabl e to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redres s . . .
42 U.S .C. § 1983 (2018).
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was wrongfully arrested in retaliation for exercising his First
Amendm ent 10 rights of speech and petition .11
Specifically , Lozman was arrested after council memb er Elizabeth
Wad e tri ed to stop him from talking about public corruption during a
period set aside for public comments .12 In his First Amendm ent
challenge, Lozman argued that after he refus ed to quit speaking, W ade
"summon ed Riviera Beach Polic e Officer Francisco Aguirr e, who was
on duty at th e meeting. P etitioner [Lozman ] told Officer Aguirr e that
he was not finish ed speaking . Councilm emb er Wad e th en ord ered th e
officer to carry him out. At that point petition er was arrested,
handcuff ed , and removed from the meeting . " 13
Lozman , however, lost his retali atory arrest case before a jury, and
the U.S. Court of App eals for th e Elev enth Circuit issued an
unpublish ed opinion in 2017 affirming th e tri al court's decision not to
disturb th e verdict . 14 In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit held that a
finding of probable cause to arr est automatically defeats a false arrest
claim brought und er th e First Am endm ent. 15 In Novemb er 2017, th e
Supr eme Court granted Lozman 's petition for a writ of certiorari .16 It
fram ed th e issue before it simply: "Does th e exist ence of probabl e cause
defeat a First Amendment retaliatory-arr est claim as a matter of law ?" 17
Lozman 's attorneys contended that while th e existence of probabl e
cause to mak e an arrest may be relevant in a First Amendm ent-bas ed
10.

Th e First Am endm ent to th e U.S. Constitution provid es, in pertinent
part, th at "Co ngr ess shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the pre ss." U .S. CONST. ame nd . I. The Free Speech and Free
Pr ess Clauses were incorpora t ed mor e than nin ety years ago through th e
Fourt eenth Am endm ent Du e Proc ess Clause as fundam ental libert ies to
app ly to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U .S. 652, 666 (1925).

11.

See Brief for Petitioner at 2, Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct.
1945 (2018) (No . 17-21) ("This case arises from a dispu te over municipal
policy bet ween petitioner and the City of Rivi era Beach that culmin at ed
in petition er 's arrest in November 2006. P et ition er claims that the arre st
was the product of t he City 's host ility toward his First Amendmentprotected act ivit y .").

12.

Id . at 6.

13.

Id . (intern al citations omitted).

14.

Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach , 681 F. App 'x 746 (11th Cir. 2017) ,
vacated, 138 S. Ct . 1945 (2018).

15.

Id. at 750.

16.

Lozman , 681 F. App 'x 746 (11th Cir. 2017) , cert . grant ed, 138 S. Ct. 1945
(2018).

17.

Ques t ion Presented, Lo zman , 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018) (No. 17-21) ,
SUPREME COURT, https: // www.supr emecourt. gov/ qp / 17-00021qp.pdf
[http s://pe rm a .cc/ VWL2-57F 3] (last visited Sept. 16, 2018).
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retaliatory arrest case "it is not dispositive as a matter of law. " 18 As
Pamela Karlan told the Court during oral argument on Lozman 's
behalf , "[w]e think the best rul e is the rul e we advocated for , which is
th at probabl e cause is releva nt evidence but not always dispositive. " 19
In a Jun e 2018 ruling remarkabl e for its narrown ess, the Court held
8-1 (only Justice Clarenc e Thomas dissented) 20 that the conceded
presenc e of probabl e cause for a misd emeanor arrest did not foreclose a
First Amendm ent retaliation claim. 21 The Court confined its ruling to
the facts before th e Court and remand ed th e case to give Lozman an
opportunity to establish that "th e existence and enforcement of an
official policy motivat ed by retali ation " was a but-for cause of his
arrest .22
Although Lozman 's case is th e on e that reached th e Supr eme Court ,
many other citizen commenters have found th emselv es gaveled down or
even haul ed away in handcuffs beca use of eith er what they say or how
they say it. For instance , in F ebruary 2018, a woman was forcibly
remov ed from th e West Virgini a Hous e of Delegat es while t estifying
about industry influ ence behind a bill lowering th e st andards to obt ain
a permit for oil and gas drilling .23 Th e speaker, Lissa Lucas , was
cautioned not to make "p ersonal comments " about members of the
Hous e Judiciar y Committe e, but she persist ed in reading a list of
industry donations to committee members until her tim e expir ed and
she was dragg ed away. 24
National outrage followed a Louisi ana t eacher 's January 2018
ejection from a school-board meeting for speaking up from th e audience
to qu estion the board 's approval of a larg e pay raise for the
superintendent .25 Amat eur vid eo of a deputy ushering her out of th e
18.

Repl y Brief for Petitioner at 2, Lozman, 138 S. Ct . 1945 (2018) (No.
17-21) , https: // www. supr emecourt .gov/ Do cket PDF / 17/ 17-21 /35 653 /
20180216120140682_17-21rb.pdf [http s:/ / per ma .cc/ 7C7Q-FTRN ].

19.

Tran script of Oral Argum ent at 27- 28, Lozman , 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018)
(No. 17-21), https: //www .supr emecourt.gov / oral_argum ents / ar gum ent_
t ranscript s/ 2017 / 17-21_ ljgm.pdf [http s:/ / perma.c c/ ATU9-QT JH].

20.

Lozman , 138 S. Ct. at 1955 (Thom as, J. , dis senting).

21.

Lozman , 138 S. Ct. at 1955 (majori ty opinion).

22.

Id. at 1954- 55. As Justi ce Anthon y Kenn edy wrote for th e majorit y , "[t]he
Court need not , and does not, address the elements required to prov e a
reta liato ry arrest claim in other contexts. " Id. at 1955.

23.

Nick Visser, Woman 'Dragged ' From West Virginia Hearing Aft er Listing
Lawmakers ' Oil and Gas Donors , HUFFINGTONPOST (Feb . 12, 2018, 3:18
AM) , http s:/ /www. huffingtonpost .com/ entr y / lissa-lucas-west-virgini a_ us_
5a812a88e4b0c6726e14cb0b [https ://perma .cc/Y35B -MKCM ].

24.

Id .

25.

Merrit Kenn edy, Outcry Aft er Louis iana T eacher Arr ested During School
Board Meeting, NPR (Jan. 10, 2018, 12:40 PM) , https://www .npr.org /
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meeting and th en roughly handcuffing her in th e hallwa y went viral
with more than 1.7 million views on YouTub e. 26
In Scarborough , Main e, a 69-year-old man was arrested and charged
with criminal tr espass in Novemb er 2017 after refusing to cease his
speech to a town council , ridiculing th e town's courtship of an Amazon
headquarters
and qu estioning th e town manager 's professional
background - remarks deemed "disr espectful " in violation of a
municipal decorum policy .27 A judg e dismiss ed th e tr espass charge after
the local pros ecutor declined to pursu e it. 28
A form er teach er and school-board candidate was remov ed 29 from a
Br evard County , Florid a, school board meeting and j ailed in May 2016
after he refused to stop making accusations about misconduct by a
school employ ee. 30 A school-board member said th e speaker (who
accused a t eacher of showing a photograph of his genitals to students
during a class pr esentation) violat ed a policy forbidding "talking about
a t eacher ," which is a "personn el matt er and not allowed at Board
meetings du e to possibl e slander ."31
As th ese cases illustrat e, government bodi es with low tolerance for
disagr eea ble speech
are pushing - and
sometimes
crossing constitutional boundaries in managing citizen speech. Clear standards
are needed to minimi ze th e risk of overzea lous ejections and arrests .
In its 2018 term , th e Court has th e chance to clarify the broader
constitutional question unr esolved by Lozman: wheth er th e exist ence of
probabl e cause for any misd emeanor offense categorically defeats a
speaker's First Am endm ent claim of retaliatory arrest. Although th e
case th e Court accepted, Nieves v. Bartl ett, 32 is (as discuss ed lat er) illsections/ thetwo-way / 2018/01/10/577010534/ outcry-after-louisiana-teacherarreste d-d uring- school-board-meeting [htt ps:/ /pe rma.cc /3 97S-SJ79].
26.

Id .

27.

Julie tte Laak a, Judge Rebuffs Scarborough 's Attempt to Resurre ct Doyle
Case, FORECASTER (May 23, 2018), http: / /www.t heforecaster.net/ judg erebuffs-scarboroughs-attempt-to-resurrect-doyle-case
/ #res pond [https: / /
perma.cc/S8D3-H9D6].

28.

Id .

29.

Jessic a Chasmar, Florida School Board Candidate Haul ed Out of Public
Meeting by Police After Saying 'Penis,' WA SH . TIM ES (May 25, 2016) ,
https: // www.w as hingtontim es .com / news/2 016/ may /25/ dea n-pat era kisflorid a-school-bo ard-candid ate -haul [http s: / /pe rma .cc/ RPX3-BU5Z ].

30.

Ilana Kowars ki, Br evard School Board Candidate Arr ested Du ring LGBT
M eeting , FLA. TODAY (May 25, 2016 , 6:40 PM) , htt ps:// www.
florida today .com/ story/ news/ educa t ion/ 2016/ 05 / 24/ school-board-packedlgbt-m eet ing/848 14172/ [http s:/ /pe rma. cc/ QJM7-J7 A 7].

31.

Chasmar, supra not e 29.

32 .

S ee Bartlett v. Nieves, 712 F. App 'x 613 (9th Cir. 2017) , cer t. granted sub
nom. Nieves v. Bartl ett, 138 S. Ct. 2709 (2018).
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suited for broad pronounc em ents becaus e of its unusual facts , it
nev ertheless offers th e opportunity
to establish some governing
principl es allowing speakers to pursu e claims against ill-moti va t ed
government offici als whil e simultaneously shielding rank-and-file police
offic ers forc ed into spur -of-th e-mom ent judgm ent calls .
Part I of this Articl e initially revi ews the importance of political
expr ess ion und er th e First Am endm ent a nd the strict scrutiny standard
of revi ew to which content-based restrictions on speech generally are
subject. 33 Nex t , Part II examines th e long-standing principle against
vi ewpoint discrimination
on speech, as well as th e public forum
doctrin e.34 Part III th en considers th e primar y rationales for r estricting
speech at government m eetings .35 Part IV addr esses th e void for
vagu eness doctrin e and prior restraint regim es impos ed on speakers .36
Part V then presents a brief case study of a government policy impos ed
on speakers at public m eetings .37 Nex t , Part VI turns to th e hea rt of
the Article , examining th e constitutionality
of punishing commenters. 38
Finally , this Article concludes by calling on th e U.S . Supr em e Court to
offer clea r guidance about when th e expression of citizen-critics at
public m eetings can p ermissibl y be squelched and to r ecogni ze that th e
burd en ultimat ely remains on government officials to abide by such
principl es when confronted with speech th ey find disagr eea bl e.39

I.

POLITICAL

SP EEC H , STRICT SCR UTINY & TH E FIRST
AMENDMENT

Safeguarding poli t ica l speech is a fundamen ta l purpose of t he First
Amendmen t. 40 The Supreme Court ob served more than fort y yea rs ago
that:
[w]hatev er differences ma y exist about interpret at ions of the First
Amendment , there is practic ally universal agreement that a major
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discu ssion of
governmental affairs . This of course includes discu ssions of
33 .

Infra notes 40-58 and accompanying text.

34 .

Infra not es 59- 104 and accompanying t ext .

35.

Infra notes 105-167 and accompanying text .

36 .

Infra not es 168- 189 and accompanying t ext .

37.

Infra notes 190-200 and accompanying text .

38 .

Infra not es 201- 271 and accompanying t ext.

39 .

Infra notes 272-27 4 and accompanying text .

40.

Se e J effrey Evans Stak e, Ar e We Buy ers or Hosts ? A M em etic Approach
to the First Amendment , 52 ALA. L. REV. 1213, 1245 (2001) (noting that
"political speech which, being necessary to democra cy, lies at the heart of
the constitution al prot ect ion ") .
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candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in
which government is op erat ed or should be operate d, and all such
mat t ers relat ing to politi ca l proc esses .4 1
More r ece ntly , Justice Anthony K enn edy explain ed for th e m ajority
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 42 that "[s]p eech is
an esse nti al m echanism of d emocracy , for it is th e m ea ns to hold officials
accountable to th e p eopl e ." 43 The r ece ntly r etired justic e added that
"political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it ,
wh eth er by d esign or inadv ert ence " and not ed that laws r estricting
politic al speech must survive th e Court 's typically rigorous strict
scrutiny standard of r evi ew .44
Und er strict scrutiny, a regulation will be uph eld only if th e
government
prov es it has a compelling int er est that is served by
narrowly tailor ed t erms 45 that r estrict no mor e speech than is absolutely
n ecessa ry to serve the inter est .46 Strict scrutiny applies when speech is
restrict ed b eca us e of th e topic or id eas in qu estion .47 A mor e r elax ed
form of judicial r eview - int erm ediat e scrutiny - generally applies to
content-neutral
r eg ulations .48 Und er int erm ediate scrutiny, a content41.

Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218- 19 (1966).

42.

558 U.S. 310 (2010) .

43 .

Id . at 339.

44.

Id . at 340.

45.

S ee Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (observing t hat
"content-based restrictions on speech " are permissible only "if t hey
survive strict scrutiny," and noting th at str ict scrutiny requir es a
compelling government interest and a statute that is narrow ly ta ilored to
serve t hat intere st); United States v. Playboy Entm 't Grp., 529 U.S. 803,
813 (2000) ("If a stat ut e regulat es speech based on its cont ent, it must be
narrowl y tailored to promot e a compelling Governm ent int erest." ).

46.

See Playboy Entm 't Grp. , 529 U.S. at 813 ("If a less restrictiv e alternative
would serve th e Government's purpos e, th e legislatur e must use that
alternative. "); Sable Commc 'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("The
Governm ent may , however , regulat e th e cont ent of constitutionally
protected speech in order to promot e a compelling int erest if it chooses
t he least rest rict ive means to furt her t he articul ate d inte rest .").

47.

S ee Re ed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 ("Governm ent regulation of speech is content
based if a law applies to particular speech because of the t opic discussed
or the idea or message expressed.").

48.

Th e Supr eme Court has explain ed th at "[a] regulation that serves
purposes unrel ate d to the content of expression is deemed neutral , even if
it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others."
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). It has
emphasized that " [t]he government 's purpose is the controlling
consideration " in whet her a regulation is cont ent neutral. Id .; see also
Minch Minchin , A Doctr in e at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-R eed
Landscape , 22 COMM. L . & POL'Y 123, 124 (2017) ("If t he law only
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neutral r egulation of speech is permissibl e if it is narrowl y tailor ed to
serv e a substantial or significant inter est and leaves op en ample
alternative channels of communication. 49
Not only does th e First Amendm ent privileg e political sp eech under
strict scrutiny , but it also safeguards diss enting political speech , which
is expr ession critical of the government . P erh aps most signific antly , th e
Supr em e Court in Cohen v. California 50 prot ect ed th e right of an
individual to wear a jacket emblazoned with the words "Fuck the
Draft " through a public courthouse to express "his feelings against th e
Vietnam War and the draft ."51 The Court reas on ed that "so long as
ther e is no showing of an int ent to incit e disob edienc e to or disruption
of the draft , Cohen could not , consistently with th e First and
Fourt eenth Amendm ents , be punish ed for asserting th e evid ent position
on the inutility or immorality of the draft his jacket r eflected ." 52
Significantly , th e Court in Cohen also made it clea r both that: 1) th e
possible offens e tak en at Paul Rob ert Cohen 's m essage did not justify
suppressing it; 53 and 2) speech is prot ect ed just as much for its emotiv e
pow er as it is for its cognitive m essage .54
In addition to Cohen, the Court in Texas v. Johnson 55 famously
prot ected politic al dissent in th e form of burning the Am erican flag as

regulates the t ime , place or manner of speech, t hen the much more
government-friendly inte rmedi ate scrutin y standard is applied. ") .
49.

Ward, 491 U.S. at 803 .

50.

403 U.S. 15 (1971).

51.

Id . at 16.

52.

Id . at 18.

53.

Here, t he Court emphasized t hat "t he State ha s no right to cleanse public
debate t o the poin t where it is grammatically palatable to t he most
squeamish among us. " Id . at 25. It added that thos e offended had a rea dily
avail ab le remedy : they "co uld effect ively avoid furth er bomb ardment of
t heir sensibilities simply by ave rting their eyes ." Id. at 21.

54.

On this point , th e Court reasoned:
t hat much linguis t ic expression serves a du al communicative
fun ction: it conveys not only ideas capable of relativ ely pr ecise,
detac hed exp lication , but oth erwi se inexp ressible emot ions as well.
In fact, words are ofte n chosen as much for their emotive as their
cognitive force. W e ca nnot sanction th e view th at th e
Constitution, while solicitou s of t he cogniti ve content of individual
speech, has litt le or no regard for t ha t emotive function which,
pra ct ica lly speaking, may often be th e more important element of
th e overall message sought to be communicat ed.
Id . at 26.

55.

491 U.S . 397 (1989).
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a form of symbolic expression. 56 In reaching this conclusion , Justice
William Brennan reasoned for the majority that "[i1f there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable ."57 Brennan specified that the
Court had "not recognized an exception to this principle even where
our flag has been involved ."58
In summary , dissenting political speech - even when intemperate
and offensive - is privileged under the First Amendment. Government
efforts to restrict it , in turn, are subject to review under strict scrutiny .
These foundational points are especially important to keep in mind
when citizens engage in such expression at local government meetings
and are punished for doing so.

II.

THE

FIRST

AMENDMENT
AND GOVERNMENT
MEETINGS

This part has two sections. Initially, Section A provides an overview
of the general prohibition against viewpoint-based discrimination.
Section B then addresses the public forum doctrine in First Amendment
jurisprudence.
A.

Viewpoint Discrimination

The ability to speak directly to a government board-be
it a city
council, a school board or a college board of trustees -i s perhaps the
purest and most basic form of citizen participation. It may come as a
surprise , then , that the Constitution is not understood to guarantee
citizens a right to be heard before their elected officials make a decision;
the Supreme Court said as much in a 1984 ruling involving labor
negotiations in a community college district. 59
Once an agency does agree to accept public comment, however , the
commenting system cannot be operated in a viewpoint-restrictive way .
As the Supreme Court wrote more than twenty years ago , " [v]iewpoint
discrimination is ... an egregious form of content discrimination. The
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the
rationale for the restriction. "60
That principle remains true today. Justice Kennedy explained in
2017 that viewpoint discrimination constitutes "a form of speech
56.

Id. at 420.

57.

Id . at 414 .

58.

Id.

59.

Minn . State Bd. for Cmty . Coils. v. Knight , 465 U.S . 271, 292 (1984).

60.

Rosenberg er v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
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suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous constitutional
scrutiny. "6 1 He elaborated that such discrimination occurs when "the
government has singled out a subset of messages for disfavor based on
the views expressed. "62
Thus, if the relevant subject or category of speech is abortion,
viewpoint censorship occurs when the government allows pro-choice
views but not pro-life ones .63 At a city council meeting, in turn,
viewpoint discrimination transpires when the council stifles citizens who
criticize measures the council supports but permits speech by
individuals who laud them .
B.

Defining the Forum

When a speaker seeks to use government-owned property as a
platform for delivering a message, the degree of First Amendment
protection depends partly on the nature of the property. Some property
is recognized as being traditionally a "public forum" amenable to wideopen public discourse, where speech generally cannot be restricted on
the basis of content, such as a park or a sidewalk. 64
Government property can become a forum by designation or
tradition. In determining whether a designated public forum exists,
courts look to the government 's policy and practice to assess whether a
discernable intent exists to open the property for expressive purposes ;
courts also look to the nature of the property and its compatibility with
expressive activity. 65
Once a piece of property is declared to be a "forum" by either
tradition or designation , any regulation on the content of a speaker 's
message is presumptively unconstitutional
and is likely to be struck
down if challenged. 66 Only if a judge finds under the strict-scrutiny
standard that the restriction is absolutely necessary to achieve a
compelling governmental purpose will the restriction be constitutional. 67
Regardless of whether property is a forum by tradition or by
61.

Mata! v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (Kennedy, J. , concurring).

62.

Id . at 1766.

63.

Clay Calvert , Beyond Trademarks and Offense: Tam and the Justices'
Evolution on Free Speech, 2016-2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 25, 50.

64.

Unit ed States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).

65.

Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).

66.

"Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be bas ed on cont ent
alone , and may not be justified by reference to content alone ." Police
Dep 't of Chi. v. Mosley , 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) .

67.

Citi zens United v. Fed. Election Comm 'n , 558 U.S . 310, 340 (2010) (citing
Fed . Election Comm 'n v. Wis . Right to Life, Inc ., 551 U .S. 449 , 464
(2007)) (stating that the strict scrutiny standard analysis appli es to laws
regulating political speech).
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designation , th e government cannot pick and choose among viewpoints ;
onc e the property is op ened for one opinion, it must be open on equal
t erms to all.
But even in a public forum, the government can enforce reas on able
regulations on th e use of property that are "cont ent neutral ," applying
evenhand edly to all speakers .68 A regulation is content neutral if it is
"justifi ed without refer ence to the content of th e regulated speech ."69 A
classic exampl e of a constitutionally
permissibl e "time , plac e and
mann er " restriction is a limit on how long speakers may occupy th e
podium .7° For instance , a federal appeals court decid ed that a fiveminut e limit on speeches at a congressional hearing is a lawful , contentneutral restriction .71 At leas t one federal appeals court has uph eld a
residency requir em ent for public commenters as a content-neutral tim e,
plac e and manner restriction .72 Moreover, government bodi es plainly
may proscrib e disruptiv e interruptions by audience m emb ers speaking
outside of designat ed comment periods .73
Confusion arises when th e government seeks to restrict th e subject
matter that sp ea kers can address when using a government platform.
Acknowl edging that not every pi ece of public prop erty is amenable to
wid e-op en discours e, th e Supr em e Court recogniz ed a category of
"limit ed " public forum , in which constitutional
prot ections are
relax ed .74 In a limit ed public forum , the First Am endm ent right to be
heard may be confined to specific speakers and subjects . Cont ent-bas ed
restrictions in a limit ed forum are reasonable if they are "consist ent
with preserving the prop erty for the purpos e to which it is dedicat ed ." 75
While it is not entirely clea r how (if at all) a speaker's rights in a
limit ed public forum are superior to thos e in a nonforum , at leas t this
much seems widely acce pt ed: when th e government enforc es contentbas ed restrictions on speech in a limit ed public forum , it must show
th at thos e restrictions are tailor ed to advance an important public

68.

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).

69.

Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Viol ence, 468 U.S . 288, 293 (1984).

70.

Wright v . Anthon y, 733 F.2d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 1984).

71.

Id.

72.

Rowe v. City of Cocoa, 358 F.3d 800, 802 (11th Cir. 2004).

73.

See generally Galena v. Leone , 638 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding
dismissal of First Amendment claims aga inst chair of county commission
who ejected a speaker from a meet ing for sta ndin g up from the audience
and repeatedly objec t ing that the meeting was being held in violation of
state open-meeting law s).

74.

Rosenberg er v. Recto r & Visito rs of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).

75.

DiLor eto v. Down ey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 967
(9th Cir. 1999).
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purpos e, whil e no "tailoring " is requir ed if th e prop erty is not a forum
at all. 76
Th e Supr em e Court set forth its "forum doctrin e" in a case about
access to mailbox es in a public school. 77 In that case, P erry Education,
a union want ed to plac e recruitm ent flyers in t eac hers' inbox es, noting
th at th e boxes were built specifically for communicative purpos es. 78 The
Court , howev er , found that th e box es were not a "forum" op en to
general expr essive use , but rather, were limit ed by th eir nature to
communications about official school busin ess by authorized users .79
Th erefor e, non-school org ani zations had no constitutional right to insist
on using the mailbox es.80 Ev en in a nonpublic forum , how ever , th e
government cannot engage in viewpoint-based discrimin ation .8 1
Wh eth er speakers have a constitutionally prot ect ed right to insist
on delivering their chosen message to a public body depends , th en , on
how th e forum doctrin e applies to a governmental board m eeting .
In th e t eac her-mailbox case, Perry Education, th e Supr em e Court
its elf r eferenc ed school board m eetings as an example of a designat ed
forum , subject to the same exacting level of First Amendm ent scrutiny
as a traditional public forum .82 That r eferenc e reli ed on a prior Supr em e
Court ruling , City of Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission (hereinaft er , " WERC' '),83 in which the justic es struck
down a discriminatory practic e forbidding t eac hers from addressing th e
school board about labor matt ers if they were not official
representatives of th e bargaining unit .84 Pr edating P erry Education, the
WERC ruling did not r ely on categorizing th e forum status of a school
board m eeting . Rather , th e Court eva luat ed the prohibition on
nonunion speakers as a prior restraint , and (without using forum
76.

S ee, e.g., Dayton v. Esrati, 707 N.E.2d 1140, 1148 (Ohio Ct. App . 1997)
(explaining that in a limit ed publi c forum, cont ent-bas ed restrictions mu st
be narrowl y tailored to serve a significant government interest, while in a
nonforum , restric t ions need only be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral).
Quit e a bit of publicly owned prop erty is not any kind of forum beca use
it is not amenabl e to any expre ssive use by the public , such as the int er ior
office spaces within a courthouse , a pri son, or a public hosp it al.

77.

P erry Educ. Ass'n v . Perry Local Educators'

78.

Id. at 40, 48.

79.

Id . at 47- 48.

80.

Id.

81.

Id . at 46; see also Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885- 86
(2018).

82.

P erry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U .S. at 45 (citing City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist.
v. Wis. Pub. Emp't Relations Comm'n , 429 U.S. 167 (1976)).

83.

429 U.S . 167, 176 (1976) .

84.

Id. at 177.
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nom enclature)
discriminatory:

found

th e

restraint

imp ermissibly

content

[t]o permit one side of a debat able public question to have a
monopoly in expressing its views to the government is the
antithesis of constitutional guarantees. Wh at ever its duties as an
employer , when the board sits in public meetings to conduct
public business and hear the views of citizens, it may not be
required to discriminate betwe en speakers on the basis of their
employment , or the content of their speech .85
In concurring , Justic e Willi am Br ennan fram ed th e issu e in forum
t erms , pr esag ing th e Court's formal recognition of the doctrin e in Perry
Education. He wrot e that whil e the First Am endment do es not compel
government officials to accept public input into th eir d ecisions , when a
government body "open [s] its decisionmaking proc esses to public view
and particip ation ," First Am endm ent guarantees attach to th e publi c' s
involv ement : "In such a case , the state body has created a public forum
dedicat ed to th e expr ession of views by th e general public ." 86 And in
Justic e Br ennan 's view, sp eakers may not be exclud ed from such a
"forum " bas ed on the content of th eir m essage. 87
If the Court 's words in P erry Education and WERC were tre at ed
as the last on es, then th e analysis of speakers' rights would be a simple
on e: speech to a government body receives th e high est constitutional
prot ection and may not be silenc ed or p enali zed bas ed on content
absent a compelling justification . Low er courts, how ever , hav e not
consistently adh ered to this line of thinking .
The forum doctrin e' s application has confounded courts, including
the Supr em e Court. It has produc ed hard-to-r econcil e r esults as courts
struggle with distinguishing betw een a "limited " and "designat ed "
forum and grapple with th e permissibl e scope of a forum 's limitation .88

85.

Id . at 175- 76.

86.

Id . at 178-79 (Brennan , J ., concurring).

87.

Id. at 179. In his concurring opinion, Brennan relied principally on the
Court 's 1972 ruling in Police Dept . of Chi . v. Mosley, in which t he Court
held , on both First Am endm ent and Equal Prot ection grounds , that a
municip ality cou ld not enforc e a select ive prohibition on certain types of
picketing on sidewalks ou ts ide public schools. See id . (citing 408 U.S . 92
(1972)). In Police Dept . of Chi. , th e Court said: "Se lect ive exclu sions from
a public forum ma y not be based on conte nt alone, and ma y not be
ju st ified by reference to content alone. " Poli ce Dept. of Chi ., 408 U.S. at 96.

88.

S ee Mark Rohr , Th e Ongoing Mystery of th e Limit ed Public Forum, 33
NOVA L . REV. 299, 306 (2009) (critiquing Supreme Court 's "dist inctly
unh elpful " guidance in failing to clea rly define what a limit ed public forum
means); Lee Rudy, A Proc edural App roach to Lim it ed Public Forum
Cases, 22 FORDHAM U RB. L .J. 1255, 1262-6 3 (1994-1995) (commenting
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In their admirably thorough 2011 survey of cases involving speech at
public meetings , T erri Day and Erin Bradford document ed how courts
ha ve struggled to adapt the Suprem e Court 's shifting and unh elpful
forum categories to governmental meetings .89 "It is fair to say ," th ey
assert , "that th e circuit courts ' jurisprud enc e in this area is a morass of
confusion . "90
As Day and Bradford obser ve, th ere may even be subcategories of
'" limited' designat ed " and '" unlimit ed ' designated " forums to which
different levels of prot ection apply .91 On e of the Supr em e Court 's
seminal forum-spe ech cases, International
Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee ,92 indicat es that speech within th e range
defining th e boundari es of th e limited forum receiv es th e fullest
prot ection of th e First Am endm ent , just as would apply in a traditional
public forum .93
Safeg uarding th e rights of speakers in a "limit ed " forum has prov en
challenging . Gov ernment agencies have adeptly convinced the courts to
defer to content -based limitations that hav e th e effect of silencing
citizen critics . In an illustrativ e case, the U .S. Court of Appeals for th e
Second Circuit rul ed against th e editors of a high-school student
newspap er in New York whos e editorial cartoon mocking the school 's
sex-education program was censored , even though th e school had
manifest ed an int ent to maint ain the publication as a public forum .94
Beca us e th e forum was "limit ed ," th e court held th e school had th e
same authority as it would in a nonforum to remove any speech that
"conflicts with th e school's legitimate p edagogical concerns . " 95 As a
result of such pond erous interpr etations , it is uncertain how much
prot ection , if any, a speaker gains when public prop erty is id entifi ed as
a limit ed public forum as oppos ed to not being a forum at all.
Th e prevailing view is that a public-comm ent session is mor e akin
to a limit ed public forum , in which content discrimination is permissibl e
and government restrictions are viewed mor e deferentially . At least four
circuits hav e categorized th e open-mic period as a "limit ed " forum , in
that "lower courts hav e struggl ed to ap ply the Perry standard equit ab ly
to allow expression on public prop erty").
89.

Terri Day & Erin Bradford , Civility in Government Meetings: Balancing
First Amendm ent, Reputational Interests , and Efficiency, 10 FIR ST
AMEND.
L. REV . 57 (2011) .

90.

Id. at 77.

91.

Id. at 80.

92.

505 U.S . 672 (1992).

93.

Id. at 678 .

94.

Ochshorn v. Ith aca City Sch. Dist., 645 F . 3d 533 (2d Cir. 2011).

95.

Id. at 540 .
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which content -b ased r estrictions are permissibl e if th ey are r eas onabl e
and viewpoint-neutral. 96 However, other courts evaluating th e claims of
silenced commenters hav e equivocat ed 97 and some have gone as far as
to classify public hearings as "designat ed " forums. 98 If a public-comm ent
period qualifi es for th e mor e robust prot ection of a designat ed public
forum in which content-based distinctions are disfavor ed , th en silencing
or r emo ving speakers on releva nc e grounds becom es mor e difficult to
justify , as relevance is a content-based rationale .
Int erestingl y , courts in a handful of cases hav e been willing to
extend prot ection even beyond th e podium .99 Expr essing dissatisfaction
with remarks at a city council m eeting by fleetingl y making a Naz i
"heil " gesture from th e audience was held to be prot ect ed expressive
conduct, 100 as was wearing a ninja mask whil e seat ed in th e audience as
a form of prot est .101 In the Na zi salute case, the Ninth Circuit expr essed
unwillingn ess to cut off th e public's right of expr ession at th e podium ,
noting that a contrary rule would permit ejection for non-disruptiv e
conduct as insignificant as making a thumbs-down sign .102

96.

S ee, e.g., Galena v. Leone, 638 F. 3d 186, 199 (3d Cir . 2011); Fair child v.
Liber ty Indep. Sch. Dist. , 597 F. 3d 747, 761-62 (5th Cir. 2010); Re za v.
Pearce, 806 F.3d 497, 503 (9th Cir. 2015); Barrett v. Walker Ct y. Sch.
Dist. , 872 F.3d 1209, 1232 (11th Cir. 2017).

97.

See , e.g., Lower y v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 586 F.3d 427, 432 (6th
Cir. 2009) (using "limit ed" and "designat ed " forums as synonyms in
referring to a school board meet ing) ; Shero v . City of Grove , 510 F.3d
1196, 1202-0 3 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that "it is not entirely clear
whether a city council meetin g should be tr ea t ed as a 'designat ed publi c
forum' or a 'limit ed publi c forum "' but finding that the plaintiff's
challenge to a content -neutral time limi tat ion would fail under either
standard). Day and Bradford provid e an exce llent analysis of the
confusion over limit ed/ designate d status and conclude that a hybrid is
t he proper way of viewing a citi zen-comment period. See Day & Bradford ,
supra note 89, at 81-82 .

98.

S ee, e.g., Zapac h v. Dismuk e, 134 F. Supp. 2d 682, 690 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(analyzing confusion among courts over forum status but concluding that
a zoning board hea ring is a "designate d " publi c forum, a view pot entially
superseded by the Third Circuit's lat er Galen a ruling).

99.

See , e.g., Stat e v. Kan e, 696 A.2d 108 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)
(overturning conviction of audi ence memb er who was charged with
disrupting a public meeting because he made only a brief ut tera nce from
his seat asking to be heard on a point of inform at ion); see also City of
Dayton v. Esrati, 707 N.E.2d 1140, 1149 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (stating
t ha t the entirety of a meeting of elected officials is a limited public forum
"for di scussion of subjec ts related to t he duties of t hose officials").

100. S ee generally Norse v. City of Santa Cruz , 629 F .3d 966 (9th Cir. 2010).
101. See City of Dayton , 707 N.E.2d at 1143, 1149.
102. Norse , 629 F .3d at 976.
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This raises intriguing possibl e arguments , since speakers hav e been
remov ed and arrested for int errupting government meetings from th e
audience as well as from th e podium . In on e especially high-profil e case ,
a demonstrator
attending th e Senat e confirmation hearing of Jeff
Sessions for U .S. Attorn ey General was pros ecut ed for disord erly
conduct, a charge eventually dropp ed , beca use she fleetingly laugh ed
aloud wh en a senator prais ed Sessions for "tr eating all Am ericans
equally und er th e law. " 103 If th e First Amendm ent right to be heard
encompass es the entir e room , th en a speaker like th e Louisian a t eac her
dragg ed out of a school board m eeting over an exchange with th e chair
from th e audience could claim First Am endm ent prot ection even for
prolonging a debate after her podium tim e has expired. 104

III. EXAMINING

THE PRIMARY
J U STIFICATIO
R E STRICTING
SPEECH

NS FOR

Because a compelling government in te res t may override a speaker's
First Amendmen t righ ts, it is useful to consider the primary rationales
that government bodie s offer to ju st ify silencing or removing speakers.
The y are set forth and reviewed below.
A.

Avoiding "Defamation " of Governm ent Employ ees

When a journ alist questioned the validity of a Miami-Dade School
Boar d polic y that prohibi ts "individual grievances" and "personal
attac ks " during board meetings, the district 's attorney claimed t he
polic y was nece ssa ry to prevent member s of the public from defaming
school employees. 105 Avoiding defamatory remarks is perhaps the
weakest of the most commonly proffered jus t ifications for limiting
citizen comments .
Although the U .S. Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed
the nexus between injunction s on defamation and prior res tra ints , lOG it
ha s never held t hat an injunc t ion directed at defam ato ry speech is

103. Maya Salam , Case Is Dropped Against Activist Who Laughed at Jeff
Sessions's Hearing, N .Y. TI MES(Nov. 7, 2017), https: //www .nytimes.com/
2017/ 11/ 07/ us/jeff-sessions-laughter -protester. htm l [ht tps:// perm a.cc/E7CR NXAM].
104. S ee supra not es 25- 26 and accompanying t ext (addressing this incid ent).
105. Rowan Moor e Gerety, Don 't Say My Name Unless You 're Saying Thank
You , WLRN (July 24, 2016) , http: // wlrn.org /post/ don-t- say-my-nam eunl ess-youre-say ing-thank -yo u [https: / /pe rma.cc /E63 P-84P2 ].
106. Th e U.S. Supreme Court was pois ed to address in Tory v. Cochran , 544
U.S. 734, 736 (2005), whether injunc t ions are permissible in defamat ion
cases. It ultim ate ly did not decide that issue bec ause t he plaintiff died
shortly aft er oral ar gum ent. Th e Court thus resolved th e case on narrow er
gro unds.
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constitutional. 107 Conv ers ely , stat e and federa l courts , alike, hav e widely
recogni zed that equity will not enjoin defamation .108
As early as 1839 , a New York state court recogniz ed th e link
between injunctions on libel and prior restraints in the case of
Brandreth v. Lance. 109 Where th e plaintiff sought injunctiv e relief in
anticipation of lib elous speech, the court said that it could not "a ssum e
jurisdiction of th e case pr esent ed .. . or of any oth er case of th e like
nature , without . . . attempting
to exercis e a power of prev entiv e
justic e which . .. cannot safely be entrusted
to any tribunal
consistently with th e principles of a free government" or without
infringing on free speech. 110
Inst ea d , courts hav e long recogniz ed that damag es, not injunctions ,
are th e appropriate remed y in defamation cases . In other words , courts
view subsequent punishment of actionable defamation preferable to any
prior restraint of th e speech .111 Ev en befor e the adoption of th e First
Am endm ent , "th e court in Respublica v. Oswald explain ed that
although 'libelling [sic] is a great crime' it is well und erstood that 'a ny
attempt
to fett er th e press ' is unacceptable . Ev en though the
defendant 's 'offenc e [sic] [was] great and persist ed in ,' th e Court did not
enjoin th e defendant 's futur e sp eech. " 112
Prior r estraints used in anticipation of defamatory speech have been
held unconstitutional even wh en th e sp eaker has already display ed a
history of engaging in such speech .113 A district court in th e District of
107. Org anovo Holdings , In c. v. Dimitrov , 162 A.3d 102, 119 (Del. Ch. 2017).
108. See RODNEY SMOLLA, LAW OF D EFAMATION § 9:85 (2d ed . 1999) ;
Michael I. Meyerso n , The Neglected History of the Prior Restraint
Doctrine: Red iscovering the Link Between the First Am endm ent and the
Separation of Powers, 34 IND. L . R EV. 295, 308-11 , 324-30 (2001).
109. 8 P aige Ch. 24 (N.Y. Ch. 1839).
110. Id. at 26.
111. Erwin Chemerinsky, Injunct ions in Defamation Cases, 57 SYRACUSEL. REV.
157, 169 (2007).
112. Id. (quoting Respublica v. Oswald , 1 Dall. 319, 324-25 , 328 (Pa . 1788)).
113. Gold v. Maur er, 251 F. Supp. 3d 127, 129, 134- 35 (D.D.C. 2017); see also
Demby v. English, 667 So. 2d 350, 355 (Fla . Dist. Ct . App . 1995) (calling
it a "well establish ed rul e that equity will not enjoin eith er an actual or a
t hr eate ned defamat ion") (quo t ing Unite d Sanit at ion Servs. of Hillsborough ,
Inc . v. City of Tampa , 302 So. 2d 435 (Fla . Dist . Ct. App. 1974)) ; Mazur
v. Szporer , No. Civ.A. 03-00042(HHK), 2004 WL 1944849, at *7 (D.D.C.
Jun e 1, 2004) ("A n injunction is not available to prevent act ual or
t hrea te ned publications of a defamatory character absent a showing of a
'violation of some prop erty right, or some br each of trust or contra ct, ' or
unless the defamator y langu age is 'used as coercion in connection with
picketing; or is connected with violence or the injuring of property .'" )
(quoting Montgom ery Ward & Co. v. Unit ed Ret ail, Whol esale & Dep 't
Store Emps. of America, 79 N.E.2d 46, 48, 50 (Ill. 1948)).
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Columbia , for instanc e, recentl y held that a corporation's dir ectors were
not entitled to a gag ord er against a former dir ector, even though he
had already allegedly defa m ed them and was expected to mak e
additional similar statements at an imp ending busin ess meeting. 114 Th e
court was particularly concerned that th e gag ord er would be an
unconstitutional prior restraint on First Amendment rights. 115
Th e First Amendment
strongly prot ects citizen speech to
government officials addressing matt ers of public concern . Ind eed , th e
First Am endm ent not only prot ects th e freedom of speech, but also th e
freedom to petition government officials for a redress of grievances . A
restraint on speech to elect ed bodi es imp erils both of th ese rights .
A city, county, or school district tak es action only through th e acts
of its employ ees .116 Critici zing th e way a government agency delivers
services almost always requir es commenting on the performanc e of
public employ ees . For this reas on , r estraints on using nam es, dir ecting
comments at particul ar memb ers of an elected body , or criticizing
employ ees ' performanc e should never pass constitutional must er.
Defamation law recogni zes that - especially wh en it comes to highranking officials - criticism of government
employ ees occupi es a
uniqu ely prot ect ed status. The burden for a "public official " (such as a
county commissioner or school superintendent) to win a defa mation suit
is purpos efully high , recogni zing th e need for citizens to feel confident
they can safely voic e dissatisfaction with government services or diss ent
from government prioriti es.117
Th e argument that criticism of employees must be forbidd en to
prev ent defamation fails on two lega l grounds. First , not all critical
speech is defa matory . Defamation r equir es proof of a fals e statement of
fact .118 Accurat ely describing wrongdoing by a school employ ee is a nondefamator y act of constitutionally
prot ect ed speech .119 Second , a
114. Gold , 251 F. Supp. 3d at 137.
115. Id . at 134- 35.
116. See Will v . Mich. Dept . of State Police, 491 U .S. 58, 79 (1989) ("The
reason why States are 'bodies politic and corporate' is simple: just as a
corporation is an entity that can act only through its agents, '[t ]he State
is a poli t ical corporate bod y , can act only through ag ents , and can
command only by laws.'" ).
117. S ee N .Y. Times Co. v . Sulliv an , 372 U .S. 254, 279- 80 (1964) (holdin g that
t he First Amendment requires proof of actual malice before a publisher
may be held respon sible for purport edly false statements leve led ag ainst
an electe d publi c official) .
118. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepp s, 475 U .S. 767, 775-76 (1986).
119. In fact, at least one court has held that test imon y at a publi c meet ing
about t he conduct of a school employee is privileged on t he grounds of
conveying information to a gove rnm ent agency about a matt er of publi c
concern . Nod ar v . Balbr eath , 462 So . 2d 803 (Fla. 1984).
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restraint on referring to identifiable individuals fails the constitutional
test of "overbreadth, " since it restrains far more speech than is
necessary to accomplish its objective. 120
B.

Enforcing Decorum and Civility

Restrictions on commenters are somewhat more easily defensible if
justified by reference to the government's interest in running a decorous
meeting. Courts have at times found that "order" is a sufficient ly
substantial governmenta l interest to justify removing speakers who
express themselves in harsh or confrontationa l ways. 121 "Decorum, "
however, is an expansive and elastic concept that can be abused . When
government bodies appear to be insulating their own members against
criticism rather than policing disorder, courts readily strike down
speech-restrictive policies. 122
Judges sometimes have difficulty assessing whether "decorum"motivated restrictions are content-based (because they involve the
speaker's choice of words) or content -neu tral (because they might be
triggered by an especially boisterous manner or tone) . Regulations that
clearly seem targeted to the substance of a speaker's message are, at
times, mistakenly deemed to be "content neutral."
For example, a federal judge decided that a City of Topeka
regulation prohibiting "personal, rude or slanderous remarks" at city
counci l meetings was a constitutionally
valid , content-neutral
regulation. 123 But the rule should have been analyzed as content-based,
because it targeted the speakers' choice of words rather than their
120. See United States v. St eve ns , 559
restriction on speech may be struck
applications are unconstitutional,
plainly legitim ate sweep") (internal
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
n.6 (2008)).

U.S 460, 473 (2010) (ho lding that a
down "if a substantial numb er of its
judged in relation to the statute's
quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Republican Party , 552 U .S. 442 , 449

121. Se e, e.g., Fairchild v. Liberty Indep. Sch. Dist ., 597 F .3d 747, 760 (5th
Cir. 2010) (finding that avoidance of "naming or shaming " teachers was
a legitimate governmental interest justifying a prohibition on speakers
using th e public-comment period to discuss grievances against school
emp loyees); Charnley v. Town of South Palm Beach, No. 13-81203-CivRosenberg/Hopkins , 2015 WL 12999749 , at *7-8 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2015)
(finding that "disparaging personal remarks" were unprotected speech in
the limited public forum of a town council meeting , and citing other
"decorum " cases in which "truculent" behavior, including repeatedly
int errupting the chair , hav e been treated as grounds for silencing
speakers) .
122. See, e.g., Griffin v. Bryant , 30 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1171- 72 (D.N.M. 2014)
(finding that proscription against "any negativ e mention" of memb ers of
the city council or their emp loyees at municipal meeting was viewpoint
discriminatory and failed the test of strict scrutiny).
123. Scroggins v. City of Top eka , 2 F. Supp . 2d 1362, 1372 (D . Kan. 1998).
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m ethod of delivery . Had th e judg e analyzed the rul e prop erly, it would
hav e been declar ed unconstitutional beca use of its excessive breadth .
"Rud e" and "personal " are not t erms with any accepted lega l definition ,
and any pot enti al sp eaker would be unabl e to anticipate what spe ech
is and is not permitt ed , which is a r ed flag of unconstitutionality. 124
Enforcing decorum by muting a citizen commenter risks giving
effect to th e disfavor ed "heckler's veto ." 125 Where th e government's
rationale is that a speaker's opprobrious remarks might incit e oth ers to
misbeh ave, th e constitutionally sounder r espons e is to enforc e rul es
against the audience's nonsp eech misbehavior.
In the nam e of civility , board polici es commonly prohibit "p ersonal
attacks " (or some vari ation of that formul ation) during the comment
period . Wh ere "a ttack " is construed to mea n "criticism ," especially if
the restriction ext ends to public officials such as school superintendents
or board memb ers , th e restriction is vuln era ble to challenge . As
addressed below , courts are split as to wheth er a prohibition on
"personal attacks" is disfavor ed as a r estraint on content or viewpoint ,
or if it should be viewed as a content-neutral restraint on th e speaker's
"mann er " of delivery.
1.

"P ersonal Att ack" Polici es Stru ck Down

Policies aga inst "personal attacks" do not typically survive
constitutional scrutin y, but there is no clear consensus about how to
analyze such policies. Typically , courts have deemed "attac ks " to be a
viewpoint- or content-discriminatory
term that connotes an intent to
suppress only disapproval but not approval. 126
For example, the Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of a former county
commissioner who claimed his First Amendment right s were violated
when he was excluded from addressing the commission because he
submitted a form indicating that he in te nded to talk about the recently
appointed county m anager. 127 The speaker, Gregorio Mesa, had been
124. S ee Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U .S 104, 108 (1972) ("[W]e insist
t hat laws give the person of ordinary inte lligence a reasonable opportunity
to know wh at is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws
may trap the inno cent by not providing fair warning.").
125. See Brown v. Louisian a, 383 U.S . 131, 133 n.1 (1966) ("Participants in an
ord erly demonstration in a publi c pla ce ar e not charg ea ble with th e
danger , unprovok ed except by the fact of the constitutionally protected
demonstra t ion itself , that their critics might react with disorder or
viol ence." ).
126. S ee, e.g., MacQuigg v . Albuquerque Pub . Sch. Bd . of Educ. , No . 12-1137
MCA/KEM, 2015 WL 13659218, at *5 (D.N.M. Apr. 6, 2015) (finding
that "pe rsonal atta cks" policy is viewpoint-bas ed beca use it restricts only
critical speech about government officials , including elected board
members) .
127. Mesa v. Whit e, 197 F.3d 1041, 1047- 48 (10th Cir. 1999).
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part of a narrow majority that vot ed to fire th e county manager, but
after a new election cycle changed th e makeup of th e commission , th e
fired manag er was reinstat ed . Beca use Mesa 's antipathy
for th e
manag er was well known , the court found it reas on able to infer that
the commission assumed his remarks would be critical. 128 Henc e, his
exclusion was content-based. 129
A California federal district court struck down a school-district
bylaw prohibiting "improp er conduct or remarks " by public present ers ,
finding it content-based
and inad equat ely tailor ed to prot ect th e
public 's ability to debat e th e fitn ess of school leaders .130 Th e district
defined "improp er remarks " as "complaints against an individual
employee ." A speaker who twic e was silenced while trying to raise
qu estions about th e qualifications of th e district school superintendent
sued to invalid at e th e bylaw, and a judg e found th e restrictions
unconstitutional :
[d]ebat e over publi c issues, including the qualificat ions and
performance of public officials (such as a school superintendent),
lies at the heart of the First Amendment ... Central to these
principles is the abilit y to question and challenge the fitness of
the administrative leader of a school district , especially in a forum
created specifically to foster discussion about a community 's
school system. t 31
Similarl y, a federal district court in New J ers ey viewed a school
board 's prohibition
on "personally
dir ect ed " comments
to be
imp ermissibly content-discriminatory
and insuffici ently tailor ed to
serve th e purposes of th e forum . i 32 And a federal district court in
P ennsylvani a found th at an offend ed "sense of propri ety " was an
unlawfully viewpoint-based reason for suppr essing a speaker who
m ention ed th e nam es of a pr esent and form er councilmember during
remarks at a zoning hearing. i 33
Not all analyses, how ever , find content or viewpoint discrimination
in a ban on "p ersonal attacks. " In Virginia , the state 's attorney general
issu ed an int erpr etation instructing th e Franklin City School Board to
stop enforcing a regulation
banning "personal attacks against

128. Id .
129. Id. at 1048.
130. Leventhal v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 973 F. Supp. 951, 953, 957 (S.D.
Cal. 1997).
131. Id . at 958 (citations omitted).
132. Moore v. Asbury Park Bd . of Educ. , No . 05-2971, 2005 WL 2033687, at
*9-10 (D.N.J . Aug. 23, 2005) .
133. Zapa ch v. Dismuk e, 134 F. Supp. 2d 682, 693 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
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employ ees" and comments that "id entify specific individuals " during
the public portions of m eetings . 134 Attorn ey General Mark Herring
concluded that the rul e was not bas ed on content, beca use it prohibit ed
all mentions of identifiable peopl e (stud ents as well as employe es) and
did not differentiate based on th e speaker's messag e. 135 Neverth eless,
even a content-neutral regulation can be struck down as invalid if it is
unreasonabl y broad or vagu e- and th e Franklin school board 's flunk ed
the test .
Rega rding th e school board comment period as a "limited public
forum " for th e expression of public views , Herring wrote th at the school
board could not bar speakers from raising "personn el issu es or
id entifying individual school employees or officials during public
session ." 136 Th e school board 's lawy ers argued that speakers could
requ est to air personn el grievances in a closed-door session, but Herring
not ed that th ere is no assurance th e requ est will be granted: "I conclude
th at allowing discussion of individual school employees only during
clos ed session do es not m eet th e constitutional standard of 'leaving op en
ample channels of communication. "' 137
Without deciding wheth er th e policy was content- or viewpointbas ed , a federal court struck down the Virginia Beach school board 's
polic y prohibiting "p ersonal attacks," calling it an unconstitutional
prior restraint. 138 The school district defended the restriction by
insisting it applied only to "personal" remarks (such as "th e princip al
is a liar ") and not to complaints about professional conduct (such as
"the principal lied about spending th e mon ey" ) .139 But th e court found
th at the regulation would inhibit speakers from voicing opinions about
school officials beca us e th e average person would not mak e such a
distinction and would assume that any criticism mentioning an
employ ee's nam e was forbidd en , essentially applying a vagueness -b ase d
analysis rather than a strict, forum-bas ed analysis. 140
A federal district court in California ord ered a school board not to
enforc e a r egulation prohibiting "charges or complaints against any

134. Mark R. Herr ing, Att 'y Gen. of Va. , Opinion Letter on th e rul es of the
Franklin City School Board rest rict ing the speec h of speakers at public
meetings to the Hon . Richard L. (Rick) Morris , Va . House of Delegates
Member (Apr. 15, 2016) , http: // ag.virginia.gov / files/ Opinions /2 016/ 15020_Morris.pdf [https: //pe rma.c c/ Y52B-RBPT ].
135. Id . at 2.
136. Id . at 3.
137. Id .
138. Ba ch v. Sch. Bd. of Va. Beac h , 139 F . Supp. 2d 738 (E.D. Va. 2001).
139. Id . at 742-43 .
140. Id . at 743.
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employee of the District" during board meetings. 141 The plaintiff, who
was silenced and ultimately removed from the room by sheriffs ' deputies
when addressing the board about why grievances against a principal
and superintendent went unaddressed, argued that the rule violated her
free-sp eech rights .142 The judge agreed , in a ruling that was primarily
based on the California state constitution 's strong free-speech
protections rather than on federal law. 143 The judge found that
protecting employees against speech stigmatizing them or invading
their privacy was not a compelling governm ent interest overriding the
public 's right to be heard .144 (The judge also noted that the policy was
not well-tailor ed to its purpose ; for instanc e, a speaker could reveal
intimate personal information about an employee without violating the
policy, as long as the disclosure was not a "charge" or a "complaint ." ) 145
2.

"Personal Attack " Policies Uph eld

While most courts disfavor policies against "personal attack" speech
as content- or viewpoint-based, a handful of courts have found the
restrictions constitutional.
For example, the Fourth Circuit rejected a facial challenge to a
county policy forbidding "personal attacks " by commenters at public
meetings. 146 The plaintiff, who opposed a pending rezoning proposal ,
was cut off when he began criticizing how members of the commission
behaved during the hearing. 147 The interruption
escalated into a
shouting match that ended with the commenter, Robert Steinburg ,
being led out in handcuffs. 148 The Fourth Circuit upheld the policy
against "personal attacks" as a content-neutral
restriction on the
manner of speech:
Because of government's substantial interest in having such
meetings conducted with relative orderliness and fairness to all,
officials presiding over such meetings must have discretion , under
141. Baca v. Moreno Vall ey Unified Sch. Dist., 936 F. Supp. 719, 725, 738
(C .D. Cal. 1996).
142. Id . at 726- 27.
143. Id . at 727- 28, 731- 32.
144. Id . at 732- 33.
145. Id.
146. Steinburg v. Chesterfield Cty. Planning Comm'n, 527 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2008).
147. See id. at 382 (quoting plaintiff 's comments : "What you are talking about,
I have no idea. Mr . Geck er, you in particular , lea ning over and saying
this, that , and th e oth er thing , but I can t ell you from a perception
standpoint from someone who is concerned, like myself and the others in
this room , it 's not very flattering .").
148. Id. at 383.
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the 'reasonable time, place and manner ' constitutional principle,
to set subject matte r agendas, and to cut off speech which th ey
reasonably perce ive to be, or immin entl y to thr eaten , a disruption
of the ord erly and fair progr ess of the discussion , wheth er by
virtue of it s irr eleva nce, its duration , or its very tone and
mann er. 149
In a 2010 case, a federal appeals court refus ed to strike down a
T exas schoo l district 's restrictions that forbad e speakers from using th e
microphon e to air comp laints about specific district employ ees .150 A
thr ee-judg e pan el of th e Fifth Circuit analyzed th e restriction as an
ext ension of th e school district 's complaint-resolution
proc ess .151
Beca us e th e district had a complaint m echanism requiring grievances
to first be pr esent ed to a low er-l evel district employ ee befor e the board
would hea r th em , th e judg es regarded th e restriction on speech as a
legitim at e m ethod of enforcing compliance
with th e complaint
proc edure .152
Th e ruling is fairly narrow and it can be int erpr et ed as applying
only to speech that involv es disput es with employ ees that are subject
to a formal grievance proc edur e. That is diff erent from saying th a t a
board could constitutionally prohibit th e m ention of any nam es, a much
broad er restriction.
C.

R elevancy and Rep etition

Some bodies provide a true "open mic " complaint oppor t unit y at
which speakers may address any topic , but there is no constitutional
imperative to do so . The Supreme Court has said that the Constitution
a ffords no guarantee for the public to be he ar d at government
meetings. 153 More commonly, t he public-commen t period is limi t ed to
matters currently before the board for consideration -or at least within
the bod y's jurisdi ct ion , whether imminentl y pending or not .154
When government bodies restrict public speakers on the grounds of
efficiency, courts generally defer to those judgment calls. It is widely
149. Id . at 385 (quoting Collinson v. Gott , 895 F.2d 994, 1000 (4th Cir. 1990)
(Phillips , J. , concurr ing)).
150. Fairchild
2010).

v. Liber ty lndep. Sch . Dist ., 597 F.3d 747, 747-48 (5th Cir.

151. Id . at 751, 760.
152. Id . at 760- 61.
153. Minn . Sta te Bd . for Cmty. Coils. v. Knigh t , 465 U .S. 271, 285 (1984)
("However wise or practicab le var ious leve ls of public participation in
various kind s of policy decision may be, this Court has never held, and
not hing in t he Constitution suggests it should hold, t ha t government must
provide for such participa t ion .").
154. S ee id. at 284.
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accepted that a government body can restrict sp eech addressing issues
beyond either th e scope of the body 's jurisdiction or even th e scop e of
the agenda of immin ently pending issu es. 155 Th e Supr eme Court
appeared to countenance relevance-bas ed standards in its pr e-forum
opinion in WERC , in th e context of a claim th at a speaker was
selectively excluded on th e basis of union affiliation: "Pl ainly , public
bodi es may confine their meetings to specified subj ect matt er and may
hold nonpublic sessions to transact busin ess. " 156 Courts commonly
uphold th e authority of government bodi es to remo ve speakers on th e
grounds of unduly r epetitious or irrel eva nt testimony . 157
For exampl e, a Florida mayor was found to hav e authority to ej ect
a sp ea ker who refus ed rep eat ed requ ests from th e chairman to limit his
comments to the it em on th e agenda and respond ed with belligerent
remarks interpr et ed as thr ea t ening. 158 Th e decision reli ed in part on
deferring to th e split-second judgm ents th at a pr esiding officer must
mak e "without th e benefit of leisur e refl ection " in assessing whether a
speaker will eventually get back on topic .159 Th e U .S. Court of App ea ls
for th e Sixth Circuit found no First Am endment violation wh en th e
par ents of high school football play ers were denied a repeat opportunity
to air grievances about purport ed mistr ea tm ent by th e he ad coach .160
Sinc e th e par ents had been fully heard onc e, th e desire to avoid wasting
time with repetitious t estimony qualifi ed , in th e court 's view , as a
content-neutral regulation of tim e, pl ace and manner. 161
Finally , a New Mexico court uph eld a school board 's prohibition on
raising "p ersonn el issu es" during th e public-comm ent period on
relevance grounds. 162 Because th e board had minimal authority over

155. See , e.g., Eichenlaub v. Twp . of Ind. , 385 F .3d 274, 281 (3d Cir. 2004)
("[M]att ers pr esent ed at a citizen's forum may be limit ed to issues
german e to town governm ent."); Br eslin v. Dickin son Twp. , No. l:09- CV 1396, 2012 WL 7177278 , at *14 (M.D. Pa. March 23, 2012).
156. City of Madi son Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wi s. Emp't Relations Comm'n ,
429 U.S. 167, 176 n.8 (1976).
157. White v. City of Norwalk , 900 F.2d 1421, 1425- 26 (9th Cir. 1990)
(recognizing mod erator 's role to limit "unduly repetitious or larg ely
irreleva nt " comments).
158. Jon es v. Heyman , 888 F.2d 1328, 1334 (11th Cir. 1989) . Th e government's
case for enforcing relevanc e sta ndard s was bolstere d by the ava ilabilit y of
a catc h-all commen t period at the end of each meet ing , of which the
spea ker in Jones failed to take ad vant age of. Id .
159. Id.
160. Lowery v. J efferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 586 F.3d 427, 427 (6th Cir. 2009).
161. Id . at 433- 34.
162. MacQuigg v. Albuqu erqu e Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. , No. 12-1137
MCA/KBM , 2015 WL 13659218 , at *3- 4 (D.N.M. Apr. 6, 2015).

44

CASE

WESTERN

RESERVE

LAW REVIEW·

VOLUME

69 · ISSUE 1 · 2018

The Open Mic, Unplugged

personnel matters except for hiring and firing the superintendent, the
court found that the board could forbid discussion of personnel
matt ers- except
for
commenting
on
the
superintendent 's
performance - in the name of maintaining decorum and order. 163
D.

Policing Disruptive Behavior

When the speaker's behavior disrupts good order or imminently
threatens to do so, the government's interest is at its highest and the
speaker's is at its lowest. Regulations on the content of speech are more
defensible when they are paired with some showing of disruptive
conduct or effect. For instance, profanity cannot be categorically
outlawed unless there is a showing that the speech was delivered in a
disruptive or threatening way .164
A government body may remove a speaker who causes a
disturbance-shouting
or refusing to leave after the expiration of a time
limit-without
violating the First Amendment. 165 In a 1966 case, New
Jersey 's Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of applying a
"disorderly persons " statute
to a citizen activist who made
"distract [ing]" remarks from the audience, threatened to escalate those
remarks , and resisted removal by locking arms with another person .166
The line of reasoning that speakers may be removed for disruptive
behavior apart from their message is rooted in the Supreme Court 's
0 'Brien standard , which recognizes that speech may be "incidental [ly]"
burdened by regulations aimed at nonspeech conduct, so long as the
restriction furthers an important government interest and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. 167
IV.

THE

VOID FOR VAGUENESS
DOCTRINE
LICENSING
REGIMES ON SPEECH

A government regulation affecting speech
the U.S. Supreme Court observed in 2007, "it
of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what
standardless that it authorizes or encourages

AND

is unconstitutional if, as
fails to provide a person
is prohibited , or is so
seriously discriminatory

163. Id . at *4.
164. See Leonard v. Robinson , 477 F.3d 347, 359 (3d Cir. 2007).
165. Kirkland v. Luk en , 536 F . Supp. 2d 857, 881 (S.D. Ohio 2008); see also
Whit e v. City of Norwalk , 900 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding
an ordinance that prohibited speech during council meetings that
"disrupts, disturbs or otherwise impedes the orderly conduct of th e
Council meeting").
166. Sta t e v. Smith, 218 A.2d 147, 148-49, 153 (N .J. 1966).
167. Unit ed Stat es v. O'Brien, 391 U .S. 367, 376- 78 (1968).
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enforc ement. " 168 More simply put , a law is "void for vaguen ess if its
prohibitions are not clearly defin ed. " 169
The void for vagueness doctrin e flows from th e Fifth Am endment 's
due proc ess clause .170 In applying th e doctrine , the Supr eme Court
"consid er[s1 wheth er a statute is vagu e as applied to th e particular facts
at issue , for '[a1 plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscrib ed cannot complain of th e vag ueness of th e law as applied to
the conduct of others ." ' 171 Thus , as the nation 's high court not ed in
2010 , "a plaintiff whos e speech is clearly proscrib ed cannot raise a
successful vagueness claim und er the Du e Process Clause of the Fifth
Am endm ent for lack of notic e. And he certainly cannot do so bas ed on
the speech of others. " 172
Additionally , courts may give a narrowing construction
to
oth erwise vague terms to save a statute.17 3 That 's because "[t ]he
Supr eme Court has not ed that it is a 'ca rdinal principle ' of statutory
interpr et ation that a federal court must accept any pl ausible
interpr etation such that a state statute need not be invalid at ed. " 174
Vagu e laws are probl ematic for several reasons . First , th ey can lead
to self-censorship . As th e U.S. Supr eme Court observe d in striking down
portions of th e Communications Decency Act of 1996, "[t ]he vagueness
of such a regulation raises special First Am endm ent concerns beca use
of its obvious chilling effect on free speech ." 175 In other words , a vagu e

168. Unit ed States v. William s, 553 U .S. 285, 304 (2007) .
169. Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U .S. 104, 108 (1972).
170. Williams, 553 U.S. at 304 ("Vagueness doctr ine is an outgrowth not of
the First Am endm ent , but of the Du e Proc ess Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.").
171. Hold er v. Hum anitari an Law Proj ect , 561 U.S. 1, 18- 19 (2010) (quoting
Viii. of Hoffm an Estates v. Flip side, Hoffm an Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
495 (1982)).
172. Id. at 20.
173. See Abbe R. Gluck & Rich ar d A. Posner , Statutory Interpretation on the
B enc h: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on th e Federal Courts of App eals,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1340 (2018) ("Judg es almost always addr ess
issue s of vagueness by giving the statute a narrowing construction , rather
than inv alidat ing it .").
174. Stuar t Buck & Mark L. Rien zi, Federal Courts , Over-breadth , and
Vaguen ess: Guiding Principles for Constitutional
Challenges to
Uninterpreted State Statut es, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 381, 381; see NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U .S. 1, 30 (1937) ("The cardinal
principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destro y. ").
175. Reno v. ACLU , 521 U .S. 844, 871- 72 (1997).
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law may det er speech. 176 As Professor Fr ederick Schauer explain ed it ,
"[a1 chilling effect occurs when individuals seeking to engage in activity
prot ect ed by the first amendment are det err ed from so doing by
governmental regulation not specifically dir ect ed at that prot ect ed
activity ." 177 A chilling effect is constitutionally significant beca use, as
Professor Leslie Kendrick noted , "prot ect ed expression is a particularly
valuabl e activity toward which lega l rules must show special
solicitude. " 178
Second , vagu e laws are troubling beca use of "[t ]he specter of
arbitrary enforc em ent . " 179 This dang er exists beca use "[a] vagu e law
allows th e government to tak e advantage of th e law's vague t erms to
discriminat e in a manner not eas ily det ect ed ." 180 Wh en a vagu e law
provides th e government with "unfett ered discr etion ," 181 un equal
enforc em ent may occur. As th e Supr eme Court has written , "[a] vague
law imp ermissibly delega t es basic policy matters to polic em en , judg es,
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis , with the
attendant dang ers of arbitrary and discriminatory application ." 182
All of this is exce edingly important beca use any policy impos ed on
citizen commenters at government meetings is rip e for revi ew und er a
vagu eness challenge, particularly when op en-end ed t erms like "pers onal
attack " and "irrelevant " are litt ered throughout th em . El ect ed officials
can abuse definition al ambiguity to quash political speech at public
m eetings simply beca use th ey dislike th e viewpoint expressed.
If th e public-comm ent m echanism op era t es as a "prior restraint " on
speech - that is, if a government decision-m aker may deny a speaker
the ability to be heard at all through a prior screening proc ess 183- th en
that permitting proc ess is unconstitutional
unl ess it m ea ningfully

176. S ee Fr ederick Schau er, Fear, Risk and th e Firs t Amendm ent: Unrave ling
the Chilling Effect , 58 B.U . L . R EV. 685, 689 (1978) ("The very essence
of a chilling effect is an act of deterrence .").
177. Id. at 693.
178. Leslie Kendrick , Speech , Intent , and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1633, 1650 (2013).
179. Andrew E. Goldsmith , The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court , Revisited , 30 A M. J. CRIM . L. 279, 286 (2003).
180. David H . Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges , 85 B.U. L . REV. 1333, 1359
(2005) .
181. Carissa Byrn e Hessick, Vagu en ess Principl es, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1137,
1143 (2016).
182. Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U .S. 104, 108- 09 (1972).
183. See Se. Promotions , Ltd. v. Conrad , 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975) (defining a
prior restra int as a policy or practice that gives "public officials th e pow er
to deny use of a forum in advanc e of actual expr ession").
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constrains th e government's
ability to play favorit es.184 Licensing
requirements on sp eech must includ e "narrow , objectiv e, and definit e
standards" to guide th e decision-mak er and to give th e speaker fair
notic e of what is prohibit ed .185 Without such standards, a licensing
regim en "ra ises the specter of content and viewpoint censorship ." 186
Licensing systems regularly are struck down as unconstitutional if th ey
confer "unbridl ed discr etion " on th e permitting authority , as th e
Supr eme Court did in invalidating a Georgia permitting ordinance that
enabl ed th e county administrator to impos e (or waive) fees to use public
property for demonstrations bas ed on a wholly subjective assessment of
the event :
Th e decision how much to charge for police prot ect ion or
administrative time - or even whether to charge at all-is left to
the whim of the administrator. There are no art iculate d standards
either in the ordinance or in the count y's established prac tice.
The administ rat or is not required to rely on any objective factors .
He need not provide any explanation for his decision , and that
decision is unreview able _is7
Applying th e Supr em e Court 's "unbridl ed discr etion " cases, th e
U.S . Court of App ea ls for th e Eleventh Circuit enjoined a Georgia
school district from enforcing a multi-step permitting system that
requir ed m embers of the public to first bring their complaints to a fac eto-fac e me eting with th e superintendent before being allowed to address
the school board . iss Th e court found that th e policy constituted an
unlawful prior restraint beca use it gave th e superintendent complete
discretion to decid e whether to schedule a m eeting with a complainant,
which could indefinit ely delay th e complaint from r eac hing th e board. 189

184. See , e.g., Bach v. Sch. Bd. of Va. Beach , 139 F. Supp. 2d 738, 743 (E .D .
Va. 2001) (evaluating restrictions against criticism of school officials as a
form of prior restraint).
185. Shuttl eswor th v. City of Birmingham , 394 U .S. 147, 150- 51 (1969).
186. City of Lak ewood v. Pl ain Dea ler Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 (1988).
187. Forsyth Cty. v. Nat ionalist Moveme nt , 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992) .
188. Barrett v. Walk er Cty. Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 1209, 1214, 1230 (11th Cir. 2017).
189. Id . at 1229. But see Fairchild v. Liberty Ind ep . Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 747
(5th Cir. 2010). Th ere, the Fift h Circuit summ arily rejecte d compari sons
between a licensing system t hat requires neu tra l and objecti ve criteria
versus a screenin g system for commenters at a school board, stating that
"p resentin g does not requir e a license." Id. at 762 n.56.
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V. A

CASE

STUDY:

MIAMI-DADE

COUNTY,

FLORIDA

Restrictions on speech by concerned citizens have become an issue
in Florida's Miami-Dade school system, one of the nation 's largest. 190
The way the Miami-Dade School Board tries to constrain irrelevant or
abusive speech is, in many ways, typical of local government efforts . As
with many school districts , Miami-Dade bases its policies on a template
provided by a commercial vendor of school handbooks , NEOLA.
Formerly doing business as North East Ohio Learning Associates ,
NEOLA now claims a nationwide clientele of more than 1,500 school
districts across six states . t91 It hosts the Miami-Dade school district's
policies directly on its Neola.com website, 192 along with those of many
other districts.
Miami-Dade school board policies t93 restrict public comment in the
following ways noteworthy for First Amendment purposes :
Citizen's [sic] remarks should be directed to the presiding officer
or the Board as a whole and not to individual Board members.
Speakers may not address Board members by name and
personal attacks against individual Board members, the Board
as a whole, the Superintendent , or District staff are prohibited .
2. Speakers commenting on agenda items shall confine their
comments solely to the agenda item being discussed . During the
public hearing, speakers must limit their remarks to matters
related to the business of the District . Unless it is an agenda
item, speakers are prohibited from discussing their own pending
court cases and filed claims or comp laints against the District
or District personnel. Similarly, employees are prohibited from
discussing any disciplinary
matter
that affects them
individually unless it is an agenda item.
3. Speakers may not use any form of profanity or loud abusive
comments.
4. Any action or noise that causes or creates an imminent threat
of a disturbance or disruption , including but not limited to,
clapping, applauding, heckling , shouting comments from the
audience, or verbal outbursts in support or opposition to a
speaker or his/her remarks is prohibited . No signs or placards
1.

190. Gerety, supra not e 105 (stating that members of the school board often
interrupt complaining members of the public).
191. Mission and History, NEOLA, http: // www.n eola .com/about/missionhistory / [https: //per ma.cc/GG8H-SS5J ] (last visited Sept. 21, 2018).
192. See SCH. Bo . OF MIAMI-DADE CTY., BYLAWS & POLICIES (2011),
http://www.neola.com/miamidade-fl/
[https://perma.cc/4ETN-PGUX
].
193. See SCH. Bo . OF MIAMI-DADECTY., BYLAws & POLICIES§ 0169.1 (2017),
http ://www.neola .com/miamidade -fl/ [https ://perma .cc/4ETN-PGUX].
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shall be allowed in th e Board m eeting . P ersons exiting th e
Board meeting shall do so qui etly.
5. The Chair may notify and warn speakers that th eir comments
have gone beyond the subject matt er for which th ey had sign ed
up to address , address matt ers that are not r elat ed to the
busin ess of the School District , constitute personal attacks on
indi viduals or oth erwis e violate this policy .
6. Th e Chair may turn off th e microphon e or recess th e meeting
if a speaker persists in addressing irr elevant topics or eng ag ing
in pers onal attacks. Th e Ch air has th e authority aft er one
warning to ord er th e remov al of th e speaker from th e m eetings .
Following a warning , any person making imp ertin ent or
slanderous r emarks or engag es in boisterous behavior which th e
Chair or th e Board det ermin es constitutes an actual or an
imminent thr ea t of a disturbance or disruption shall be barr ed
from furth er app eara nc e before th e Board for the balanc e of th e
me eting. 194
Bas ed on pr evailing First Am endment caselaw, the Miami-Dade
polic y is vulnerable to constitutional challenge on several grounds. Most
notably , th e policy goes furth er than simply prohibiting criticism of
school employe es and even prohibits dir ecting comments at indi vidual
school bo ard members by nam e. Whil e it is arguably unfair for a
speaker to hav e a platform to bera te a low-level employ ee who is not
present at th e meeting to defend hers elf, the school board m embers are
present and hav e microphon es of th eir own. Any policy that insul at es
elect ed officials from criticism is doubtfully constitutional. As a report er
monitoring Miami-Dade school board m eetings obs erv ed , polici es
against "mentioning " names invites abuse, since a speaker almost never
will be silenced for commending an employee - ind eed , report er Rowan
Moor e Gerety witn essed several instanc es of sp ea kers thanking people
by nam e (including school board m emb ers) without int erruption .195
If the concern is to pr event what are commonly referr ed to as
"personal attacks ," narrow er and mor e constitutionally
sound
alternatives exist . Beca us e it is p ermissibl e for a government body to
limit irrel eva nt speech, a firml y enforc ed relevancy standard should dea l
with legitimately proscrib able speech . Remarks that are pur ely
"personal "- for exampl e, airing an allegedly adulterous relationship
involving a low-ranking city appoint ee 196- can be rul ed out of ord er on
rel eva nc e grounds . But to be constitutional , th e relevanc e standard
must apply even-hand edly , so that congratulating
th at same city
194. Id . at § 0169.l(G)(l)-(6)

.

195. Se e Gerety, supra not e 105.
196. See Scroggins v . City of Topek a, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1365 (D . Kan . 1998).
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appoint ee on his wedding anniversary would be equally out-of-order.
Dea ling with "person al attacks " by way of relevancy would p ermit a
speaker to raise "p ersonal " matt ers that are also pertin ent to public
business . For instance , multiple p ersonal bankruptci es or a large unp aid
child-support d ebt might be r elevant in discussing wh eth er an applicant
was fit to be hir ed as a county fin anci al administrator,
or it might be
relevant that the nomin ee for county school superintend ent sends her
children to privat e school.
Th e policy is also vuln erabl e b eca us e it: (1) categorically bans
profanity without rega rd to whether th e profanity is disruptiv e ;197 (2)
appears to prohibit clapping or applauding by audience m emb ers ;198 and
(3) permits th e chair to eject a speaker for "impertinent " remarks. 199
All of th ese forms of expr ess ion have been h eld to be constitutionally
prot ected . In th e view of at leas t one judicial circuit , a prohibition on
"p ersonal , imp ertin ent , slanderous or profan e r emarks " is constitutional
only if und erstood to apply to conduct disruptiv e to th e m eeting and
not to words alone. 200
Th e Miami-Dad e policy, and others lik e it , should be reexamin ed
in light of th e growing body of constitutional
caselaw disfavoring
policies that invit e viewpoint discrimination . In particular , polici es
motivat ed primarily by concerns for civility (such as "no-nam es"
polici es ) do not belong in a mandatory speech code th at can be enforc ed
by forcibl e remo va l. Beca use it is unlik ely that any elect ed board will
even-hand edly enforce a "no-nam es" policies regardl ess of the speaker 's
vi ewpoint , th ese polici es are ov erbroad for th eir int end ed purpos e and
are likely to result in viewpoint discrimin ation. School board members ,
lik e all elected officials , must tolerat e a certain amount of disagr eea bl e
speech as the "cost of doing busin ess ." Polici es that penali ze harml ess
speech in th e na me of decorum are ill-advis ed invitations to litig ation.

VI. THE CONSTIT UTIONALITY

OF PUNISHING
COMM EN TERS

CITIZEN

When a speaker occupying the podium at a public meeting runs
a foul of the bod y's standards, the options for responding are limited.
Speakers may: be in t errupted a nd told to conform to the rules ; have
their time to spe ak cut short ; be ph ys icall y removed from the meeting;
be arrested ; and even be banned from atte nding future meeting s .
Un surpri singly , the more serious the consequences for the speech, the
more justifica t ion t he government will hav e to produce.

197. S ee

BYLAWS

&

POLI CIE S §

0169.l(G)( 3).

198. Id . at § 0169.l(G)(4).
199. Id. at § 0169.l(G)(6).
200. White v . City of Norwalk , 900 F .2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990).
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A.

Prosp ective Bans

A prospective ban from future government meetings is, in a First
Amendment sense , the most serious penalty an agency can impose
because it restricts future speech as well as punishing past speech .
Barring a speaker from addressing a government body (or even
attending the meetings at all) is functionally a prior restraint , which is
presumptively unconstitutional. 201 Courts seldom , if ever , uphold
directives forbidding future attendance at government meetings , even
where speakers have caused a disturbance on past occasions.
When the chairman of an Illinois school board shut off the
microphone in the midst of a citizen activist's speech criticizing school
personnel, Komaa Mnyofu responded with a federal lawsuit. 202 Mnyofu
alleged that his speech was curtailed because of his unfavorable opinion,
an act of unlawful viewpoint discrimination. 203 He challenged the
board 's decision in U.S. district court as a violation of his First
Amendment rights. 204 The district judge agreed that Mnyofu had a
constitutionally protected right to use the public-comment period to
criticize school employees-in fact , the judge wrote, the right is "clearly
established " by decades of federal precedent. 205
In an unusual maneuver, the school district filed a "preemptive
strike" lawsuit attempting to bar Mnyofu from attending board
meetings, arguing that his demeanor demonstrated a likelihood of future
disruptive behavior. 206 The judge threw out the district 's case, finding
that a government agency cannot preemptively ban a citizen from
speaking at public meetings .207
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that an
Arizona state senator violated "clearly established" law in issuing an
edict banning those who "interrupt" proceedings from entering the
Senate office building for two to four weeks.208 The senator ordered
Capitol police to place an immigrant-rights activist on a no-entry list
201. See Neb. Pr ess Assoc. v. Stuart , 427 U .S. 539, 592 (1976) ; Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan , 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
202. Mnyofu v. Bd. of Educ . of Rich High Sch. Dist. 227, No. 15 C 8884, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45773, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2016).
203. Id .
204. Id . at *1.
205. Id . at *6-7 .
206. Erin Ga llagher, Federal Judge Bars School District's Effort to Limit
Comments, DAILY SOUTHTOWN (May 16, 2016, 7:32 PM), http: //
www.chicagotribune.com/s uburbs / daily-southtown/ news/ ct-sta-criticizing-schoolofficials-st-0517-20160516-story.html. [https: / / perma.cc/ R6HJ-S4W4].
207. Id .
208. Reza v. P earc e, 806 F.3d 497, 500- 01 (9th Cir . 2015).
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after th e activist applauded and cheered loudly while seated in the
"overflow " room watching a Senat e committee hea ring telecast from a
nea rby room . Although th e rul e, and its application to speaker Salvador
Re za, was found to be viewpoint-n eutral , it still failed th e t est of
reasonablen ess beca use prosp ectiv ely banning a speaker from a
government building without proof of dangerousn ess int erferes with th e
speaker 's right to int erac t with elect ed repr esentativ es. 209 Th e rule , both
on its face and as applied to Re za, was deem ed unr ea sonabl e becaus e it
failed to leave adequate alternative channels for th e speaker to
communicate his messag e. 210
A federal district judg e in Or egon reac hed a similar conclusion in
enjoining enforc ement of a city ordinanc e that allowed the city to
ind efinit ely ban speakers from city council chambers for disrupting
council meetings .211 Th e challenge was brought by a disability-rights
advocate who was bann ed from City Hall for sixty days after shouting
and pounding a t abl e to expr ess his distress wh en he was deni ed a
chance to address a budg et matt er beca use he had bri efly left th e
hea ring room when his turn was called .212 Whil e th e judge found that
creating a disturbanc e at a council m eeting could justify one-time
removal from th e room , th e burden to justify a prospectiv e exclusion
was greater. 2 13 The court found a sixty-day exclusion unreasonable on
the basis of "mere speculation that some persons may mak e oth ers feel
unsafe or engag e in additional disruptions . "214 Th e city 's proff ere d
alternatives - that the speaker could watch meetings on t elevision and
could mak e appointments to see council memb ers one on on e- did not
provide reasonably adequate channels to be heard .215
Similarl y, a federal district judg e in Michigan found a violation of
"clearly established " law wh en th e chair of a school board had a
dissatisfied par ent pr eemptiv ely bann ed from attendance at futur e
board m eetings and twice dir ected polic e to arrest him after he showed
up at m eetings in defiance of the ban .216 Furthermor e, a federal court
in P ennsylvania found that even a speaker 's concededly int emp era t e
behavior at a series of school board meetings - swearing , challenging a
board member to fight, and struggling with a guard who attempted to
209. Id. at 504- 05.
210. Id .

211. Se e gen era lly W alsh v. Enge , 154 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (D. Or. 2015).
212. Id . at 1121- 22.
213. Id. at 1132.
214. Id .
215. Id . at 1133.
216. Se e generally Ritchie v. Coldwater Cmty. Sch., 947 F. Supp. 2d 791 (W.D.
Mich. 2013).
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restrain him - was not enough to justify a lifetim e ban from attending
futur e meetings. 217 Although the dir ective was based on nonspe ech
conduct, it was not narrowly tailor ed to furth er an important
government interest and did not leav e th e sp eaker with adequate
alternative channe ls to be heard .2 18
Even a singl e prohibition on appearing before a municipal body can
violat e th e First Amendm ent if motivat ed by th e content of past
spe ech . Th e U .S. Court of Appe als for the Seventh Circuit held that a
mayor violat ed the First Amendm ent by refusing to allow a citizen
activist to address th e city council unl ess th e activist first apologized
for berating a city employee at a public gathering several da ys ea rlier. 2 19
As th ese cases mak e clear , government bodi es are constitutionally
constrained from imposing r etributiv e penalti es that int erfer e with
citizens' ability to communicate with their elect ed officials , even if ther e
is good reas on to suspect that thos e communications will be hostil e.220
Th e speculation that peopl e who hav e acted uncivilly at past meetings
will do so at futur e m eetings is simply too att enuat ed to deprive citizens
of their most dir ect and effective m ethod of being heard on issu es of
public concern .

B.
1.

Arrests

Th e Lozman Case Kicks the Constitution al Can Down the Road

Good-government
crusader Fane Lozman's second trip to the
Supreme Court teed up t he issue of when a speaker arrested for refusing
to yield the podium at a public meeting may challenge his arrest and
seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 22 1
For a person whose First Amendment right s are infringed by an
uncons t it utional , local-government prac t ice , the ave nues of recourse are
limited. Government agencies are generally in sulated by well-de veloped
immunity doctrines from pa ying mone y dam ages for constitutional
torts, 222 so the prevailing workaround ha s become suing the individual
decision-makers.
217. S ee generally Barna v. Bd. of Sch . Dir s. of Panth er Valley Sch. Dist., 143
F. Supp. 3d 205 (M .D. Pa. 2015).
218. Id . at 216.
219. S ee Surita v. Hyd e, 665 F .3d 860 , 866, 872 (7th Cir . 2011).
220. See generally P ac kingh am v. North Carolin a, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017)
(striking down a st at e's overbroad prohibition on social -m edia use by
convicted sex offenders , in recognition that t he ban would interfere with
the ability to parti cipate in harml ess political, social, and professional
di scussions that pose no dang er to potential victims).
221. S ee Lozman v. City of Rivi era Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018) .
222. Se e Will v. Mich . Dep't of State Poli ce, 491 U .S. 58, 63 (1989) (holding
t ha t a state agency is not a "person " liable for money damage s within the
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Lozman appealed to th e Supr eme Court after his damag es claim
against th e City of Rivi era Beac h and its th en-mayor, Michael Brown ,
was rej ect ed by a jury in a verdict summarily uph eld by the Eleventh
Circuit .223 The appeals court held that th e exist ence of probabl e cause
for a misdem eanor charge of "Disturbing a Lawful Assembly " defea ts a
claim of retaliatory arrest as a matt er of law 224 - even though th at was
not th e charge on which Lozman was actually arrested, which
pros ecutors ultimat ely dropp ed anyway .225 The Eleventh Circuit relied
on its prior ruling in a 2002 case involving an Alabama woman whos e
ret aliatory-arrest claim against a police departm ent was dismiss ed
beca use officers had probable cause to arrest her for th e felony charge
of bribing a witn ess, even though a jury ultimately acquitted her of that
charge .226
The Supr eme Court accepted certiorari and, on an 8-1 vote with
only Justice Clar ence Thomas dissenting , vacat ed th e Eleventh
Circuit 's decision and remand ed. 227 The Court found that , under th e
uniqu e set of facts present ed in Lozman's case, a retaliatory-arr est
plaintiff should get the chance to plea d and prove that his arrest was
the product of a municipal policy decision motivat ed by animus over
his exercise of constitutionally protect ed rights, even if genuine prob able
cause to arrest exist ed .228 As th e justic es obs erv ed , th e central concern
th at compelled th e Suprem e Court to recogni ze a categorical probablecause bar to a retaliatory-pros ecution claim in Hartman v. Moore 229
does not apply when , as in Lozman 's case, the claim challenges a
decision to arrest .230
In Hartman , t ech-company executive William Moore was indict ed
on charges of conspiracy and fraud involving an attempt to procure a
contract to sell equipment to th e U.S . Postal Servic e.231 Moore sued the
meaning of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, which permits recovery of damages from
any "person" who infringes constitutional rights act ing under color of
state law) .
223. Lozman v. City of Rivi era Beac h, 681 F. App'x. 746 (11th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam), vac ated, 138 S. Ct. 1945.
224. Id . at 752.
225. Id . at 749.
226. S ee generally Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002) (affirmin g
summary judgmen t in favor of t he Dothan , Alabama and several Doth an
Police Depar t men t officers) .
227. Lozman , 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018).
228. Id . at 1955.
229. 547 U.S. 250 (2006).
230. Lo zman , 138 S. Ct. at 1953-54 .
231. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 253- 54.
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federal agents who initiat ed th e pros ecution after the trial judge found
the charges lacking in factual support and direct ed a judgm ent of
acquittal. 232 Th e trial court and circuit court refus ed to grant th e federal
agents' motion for summary judgment
in Moore 's retaliatorypros ecution suit, which land ed th e case at th e Suprem e Court. 233
Moor e's attorneys urg ed the justic es to apply the traditional
burd en-shifting fram ework r ecogni zed for First Am endm ent r etaliation
cases in Mt . Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyl e,234
discuss ed in greater detail lat er. But beca us e of th e uniqu e concerns
wh en a First Am endm ent claim challenges a decision to pros ecute , the
justic es declin ed to apply Mt . Healthy and inst ea d impos ed a high er
initi al burd en to pl ea d a retaliatory-pros ecution case. The Hartman
Court found that probabl e cause conclusively foreclos es a claim that a
law- enforc ement agent wrongfully induc ed a pros ecutor to bring
criminal charges, in part beca use of th e uniqu e probl ems of proof in
trying to draw a cause -and-effect betw een the r etaliatory animus of th e
agent and th e pros ecutor's indep end ent decision to charge .235 Beca use
pros ecutors are immune from damag es actions for th eir decision to bring
charges, Justic e David Sout er wrote , a lawsuit will necessa rily be
against someone a step remov ed from th e decision to pros ecute , which
is entitl ed to a strong pr esumption of r egularity .236 Th e Hartman Court
found that it was fair to assign a plaintiff in a retaliatory-pros ecution
case th e burden of pl ea ding and proving a lack of probabl e cause
beca use it would ultimat ely be th e plaintiff 's burden to demonstrat e
that retaliation motivat ed th e charging decision and beca use th e
exist enc e of probabl e cause would (as a practical matt er) foreclos e a
finding that th e pros ecution would not hav e occurr ed but-for th e
invidious motiv e.237
In Lozman, th e justic es distinguish ed Hartman and found that th e
standard Mt. Healthy analysis for First Amendm ent retaliation cases
provid ed adequate prot ection in the specific factual setting that Lozman
present ed .238 In Mt . Healthy , the Court dev elop ed a burd en-shifting
fram ework for addressing First Amendm ent retaliation claims within
the context of employer-employee relationships. 239 Under this t est ,
plaintiffs initially carry th e burd en of demonstrating th at th ey were
232. Id . at 254-55 .
233. Id . at 255- 56.
234. 429 U.S. 274 (1977) .
235. Hartman, 547 U .S. at 261- 62.
236. Id . at 263.
237. Id. at 265- 66.
238. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach , 138 S. Ct . 1945, 1955 (2018) .
239. Mt. H ealthy , 429 U .S. at 287.
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exerc1smg a constitutionally
prot ect ed right and that, in turn , the
exercis e of this right was a motivating factor for a meaningfully adverse
retaliatory action tak en by th e government. 240 More simply put ,
plaintiffs must show three elements in a First Amendment ret aliation
case - speech , causation and injury. In other words , th e plaintiffs '
exercis e of a prot ected First Am endment right (speech) was a
motivating factor (causation) that result ed in harm (injury) suffered at
the hands of th e government .
Clearing this thr eshold in th e face of a government motion to
dismiss is not a simple matter for plaintiffs . Since the Supr eme Court
height ened th e standard for a complaint to withstand a motion to
dismiss , Plaintiffs now must pl ead something greater than just "lab els
and conclusions" and something "mor e than an unadorn ed , th edefendant-unlawfully-h arm ed-m e accusation ." 241 In fact, "only a
complaint th at states a plausibl e claim for relief surviv es a motion to
dismiss . "242 To reac h this crucial thr eshold of plausibility - a level high er
than mere conceivability - plaintiffs must set forth "fac tual content
th at allows th e court to draw th e reas onabl e infer enc e that th e
defendant is liabl e for th e misconduct alleged." 243
If plaintiffs satisfy these steps of th e Mt. Healthy test , then th e
burd en shifts to th e government to show "by a preponderance of th e
evid enc e that it would hav e reach ed the same decision " against th e
plaintiffs "even in th e absence of th e prot ect ed conduct ." 244 Th e
government is welcome here to raise th e issu e of probable cause to make
an arrest as evid enc e that it would have arrested an indi vidual
rega rdl ess of her exercising First Am endm ent prot ect ed rights. But th e
exist ence of probabl e cause here und er a Mt. Healthy analysis is not
outcom e det erminative or case killing.
In Lozman , Justic e Kenn edy 's majority opinion emphasi zed th e
uniqu e set of facts justifying application of the more forgiving Mt .
Heal thy standard:
Lozman provid ed evid enc e of a pr emeditat ed
municipal policy decision to punish him for constitutionally prot ect ed
acts of expr ession and petition th at pr edat ed his arrest, th e policy bor e
littl e relation to th e putativ e grounds for his arrest, and his speech was
of great constitutional dignit y (addr essing elect ed officials on matters
of public concern) .245 "On facts like these ," Justic e Kennedy wrote ," Mt.

240. Id .
241. Ashcroft v. Iqb al, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly , 550 U .S. 544, 548- 49 (2007).
242. Iqbal, 556 U .S. at 679.
243. Id. at 678.
244. Mt . Healthy , 429 U .S. at 287.
245. Lozman , 138 S. Ct. at 1954- 55.
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Healthy provid es the correct standard for assessing a retaliatory arrest
claim. Th e Court need not , and do es not , address th e elements requir ed
to prov e a retaliatory arrest claim in oth er contexts ."246
Analysts immediately seized on th e som ewhat logically circular
qualifi er- "facts like th ese"- to qu estion th e helpfuln ess of th e Court 's
guidance . Writing for SCOTUSblog , law professor Heidi Kitrosser
obs erv ed that th e rhetorical shrug of "facts like th ese" might hav e been
at hom e in a spoof articl e about judici al ind ecision on a satire websit e:
"As for what happ ens next , our friends at Th e Onion might say, 'It
depends. " >247
More frustrating still for thos e seeking categorical guidance,
Lozman repr esents th e Court 's second "punt " on th e issu e in less than
a decade. In a 2012 case involving th e ar rest of a Bush administration
critic who confronted then-Vic e Presid ent Dick Ch eney during a public
appearance at a shopping center , th e Court declined to decide th e
und erlying issu e of th e purport edly retali atory arr est. 248 Rather , th e
Court simply resolved th e case in favor of th e defend ant Secret Servic e
officers on qualifi ed immunity grounds, finding th e law insuffici ently
clear to put a reas onable law enforc ement officer on notic e.249
The Court 's hesitancy to coin a bro adly applicable legal standard
where a narrow one would dispos e of th e case is consistent with Chief
Justic e John Rob erts ' adherence to th e "av oidanc e" doctrine .250 That
adherence was pr esent throughout th e Court 's 2018 t erm , as seen in th e
Court 's standing-based dismiss al of a much-await ed (and as yet
unr esolved on th e merits) case involving partis an-bas ed gerrymandering
in th e Wisconsin legislatur e.251

2.

Th e Nieves Case: Avoiding Avoidance

In it s 2018 term, the Court has an opportunit y to decide whether,
out side the scenario presented in Lozman , the existence of probable
cause norm ally will deprive a plaintiff of the oppor t uni ty to argue that
246. Id . at 1955.
With Facts Like These . . . ,
247. Heidi Kitrosser , Opinion Analysis:
SCOTUSBLOG (June 19, 2018, 10:38 AM), http: //www .scotusblog.com/
2018/06/opinion -analysis-wit h-facts -like-these/ [ht tps:// perm a.cc/ 7RNWMXFQ].

248. Reichle v. Howards , 566 U.S. 658, 663 (2012).
249. Id . at 664 , 670.
250. S ee generally Clay Calvert & Matt hew D. Bunk er , Fissures, Fractures €3
Doctrinal Drifts: Paying the Price in First Amendment Jurisprudence for
a Half Decade of Avoidance , Minimalism €3 Partisanship, 24 W M. &
MARY BILL RTS . J. 943 (2016) (reviewing th e role of avoidance in First
Amendment free speech cases under the leadership of Chief Jus t ice
Rober ts ).
251. Gill v. Whitford , 138 S. Ct . 1916 (2018).
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his arrest was retaliatory . Th e case, N ieves v. Bartlett ,252 involv es a
partygoer arrested during a dispute with Alaska Stat e P atrol officers in
which he int erj ect ed his opinion as th e officers were qu estioning an
und erage -drinking suspect .253
If Fan e Lozman 's case pres ent ed uniqu ely sympathetic facts in th e
speaker's favor - speech dir ect ed to elected officials on matt ers of public
concern and a docum ent ed history of longstanding animus against th e
speaker - th e Nieves case offers its mirror imag e. Th e "expr ession " that
the plaintiff claims as th e provocation for th e r etaliation was his refusal
to talk to the officer. 254 Th e decision-maker was not a body of elected
officials but a rank-and -file police officer. And th e setting was not th e
staid confines of a commission m eeting room , but a campsite party
where alcohol was being consumed. 255 In sum, Nieves involves th e onthe-spot decision of a polic e officer with no history of animus toward
the speaker to mak e an arrest in a pot entiall y volatil e setting wh ere
safety was a concern - th e scenario in which judg es will be most inclin ed
to defer to th e officer's judgm ent call. 256 Th e case comes to th e Court
from th e Ninth Circuit 's reversal of parti al summary judgm ent to two
defendant officers , relying on Ninth Circuit pr ecedent that th e exist ence
of probabl e cause for arrest does not automatic ally divest a pl aintiff of
a First Am endm ent retaliation claim .257
That Fan e Lozman 's and Russ ell Bartl ett 's dissimil ar cases pr esent
the same constitutional issue demonstrat es th e ne ed for a flexibl e
standard to assess speakers' r etaliation claims . The Mt . Healthy analytic
fram ework supplies that standard. Mt. Healthy appropriately balanc es
the int erests in retaliatory arrest cases. It initi ally impos es burd ens on

252. Bartlett v. Nieves, 712 F. App 'x . 613 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted , 138
S. Ct . 2709 (2018).
253. Id . at 615 .
254. Bartl ett v . Nieves, No. 4:15- cv-00004-SLG , 2016 WL 3702952, at *11 (D.
Alaska July 7, 2016) , aff 'd in part and rev' d in part , 712 F . App 'x 613 ,
cert. granted , 138 S. Ct. 2709.
255. S ee id. at *1.
256. See Reichle v. How ards , 566 U .S. 658, 671 (2012) (Gin sburg , J. ,
concurring) ("Officers assigned to prot ect public officials must make
singularly swift, on the spot , decisions whether the safety of the person
they are guarding is in jeopardy . In performing that protective fun ct ion ,
they rightl y tak e into account words spok en to , or in th e proximity of,
t he perso n whose safety is t heir charge. ").
257. Bartlett , 712 F . App'x. at 616 (citing Ford v. City of Yakima , 706 F.3d
1188, 1195- 96 (9th Cir . 2013)).
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the plaintiff .258 Only if th e plaintiff satisfies those hurdl es do es th e
burd en eventually shift to th e government .259
Th e Mt. Healthy framework substantially
tracks th e formula
deployed by most state statutes design ed to counteract th e chilling
effect of strategic lawsuits against public participation ("SLAPPs ") . At
bottom , a retaliatory arrest based on th e exercise of th e First
Am endm ent rights of free speech or petition is tantamount
to a
criminal, rath er than civil, SLAPP suit . Its purpos e is to squelch
criticism on issu es of public concern . With a SLAPP suit, "[c]itiz enactivists lose beca use th ey becom e dis enfranchis ed from th e democratic
proc ess by lawsuits. "260 Ind eed , just as th e endgam e of a SLAPP is to
stifle First Am endm ent rights , in a "claim for retaliatory arrest, th e
injury occurs not beca us e of th e arrest its elf, but by th e suppression of
a constitutionally guarant eed right through me ans of an arrest ." 261
For instanc e, California 's anti-SLAPP statute allows th e victim of
a SLAPP to mak e a speedy motion to strik e a complaint if, initially ,
the victim can demonstrat e that she was exercising th e "right of
petition or free speech under the United Stat es Constitution or the
Californi a Constitution in connection with a public issu e." 262 If th e
t arget of a SLAPP satisfies this hurdl e, then the burden shifts to th e
plaintiff - th e SLAPP er , as it were - to establish "there is a probability "
th at it will pr evail on th e und erlying claim .263 This burd en shifting is
consistent with that embrac ed in the Mt. Healthy t est for retaliatory
First Amendment claims .
Imposing any greater burden on pl aintiffs is counterintuitive wh ere
the defendant is a government agency accused of suppressing citizen
speech addressing a matt er of public concern, which is subject to
rigorous judicial revi ew.264 To impos e th e hurdl e of probabl e cause as
an insurmountable burd en for Section 1983 plaintiffs contradicts th e
intensiv e, searching scrutiny to which exclusions from a public forum
should rightly be subjected.
258. Mt. Health y City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U .S. 274, 287 (1977).
259. Id .
260. ROBERT D. RI CHARDS,FR EEDOM'S VOICE: THE P ERILOUS PR ESENT AND
UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 26 (1998).
261. Randolph A. Robinson II , Policing th e Police : Protecting Civi l Remedies
in Cases of R etaliatory Arr est, 89 D ENVER U. L. R EV. 499, 514 (2012).
262. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 425.16(b)(l)

(2018).

263. Id.
264. Reed v. Town of Gilbert , 135 S. Ct. 2218 , 2226 (2015) ("Content-based
laws - those that target spe ech based on its communicative cont ent - are
presumptively
uncons t itu t ional a nd may be justified onl y if the
government prov es that th ey ar e narrowly tailored to serve comp elling
state int erest s.") .
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In rej ecting Lozman 's claim , the Elev enth Circuit reli ed on case law
dev eloped in th e context of damages claims dir ectly against th e
arresting
officers or th eir law- enforc em ent agencies .265 Courts
und erstandably hesitat e to second guess the arrest or don 't-arr est
decisions mad e by rank-and-file law- enforc em ent personnel at th e scene
of a volatile situation, which is part of th e rationale for recogni zing the
immunity bar. But where th e challenge is brought against an elected
official who is both in the chain of command of law enforc em ent and
also is th e complainant who initiates the arrest, different equiti es apply .
Th e in ability to tailor th e analysis to a situation, such as Lozman 's,
illustrat es why th e categorical probabl e-caus e bar rej ect ed by th e
Lo zman Court was an invitation to injustic e.
Because th e Mt. Healthy burden-shifting formulation enabl es a
defendant to obtain summary judgm ent by showing that th e same
arrest decision would have been mad e even absent a retaliatory motiv e,
the fram ework provid es a sufficient safety valve to insulate police
against unfound ed claims . If th e grounds for arrest are overwh elmingly
obvious , th e defendant will obtain summary dismissal and will qualify
und er 42 U .S.C. § 1988 for an award of attorney fees if th e claim is
deemed "frivolous, unr eas onable , or without foundation ." 266
In a recent gloss on anti-retaliation
law , Heffernan v. City of
Paterson ,267 the Suprem e Court held that a government employer could
be liable for unlawful retaliation even wh ere th er e is no act of lega lly
protected expression, if the victim was punished for what th e decisionmak er mistak enly beli eved he said .268 That th e victim did not int end to
convey a m essage at all- in that case, carrying a political yard sign
m erely as an errand for a family memb er- was beside th e point , Justic e
Steph en Br eyer wrote for the Heffernan majority. 269 What mattered was
that th e government
acted with a wrongfully speech-punitive
motiv ation , and that if word got around the workplace that the agency
had a practic e of firing employees who engag ed in prot ect ed political
speech, it would chill oth er speakers. 270
Th e same logic applies to th e arrested public commenter as well:
when a government decision-maker acts with th e purpose of prev enting
or punishing constitutionally prot ect ed speech, and that action causes
the speaker harm, all the elem ents of a retaliation claim are satisfied,
265. S ee Lozman v. City of Rivi era Beac h, 681 F. App'x. 746, 750- 51 (11th
Cir. 2017) (citing Rankin v. Evans , 133 F .3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998)
and Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002)).
266. Christiansburg

Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).

267. 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016).
268. Se e id.
269. Id . at 1418.
270. Id. at 1419.
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rega rdl ess of th e form th e r etaliation tak es. Ind eed , it has been said
th at even an act of retaliation as immaterial as canceling a public
employ ee' s birthday party might qualify as unlawfully retaliatory if
intend ed to send a speech-suppressive messag e. 271 Given that seemingly
tri vial slights can be actionable acts of retaliation , it strains credulity
th at ord ering the arrest of the sp ea ker could be th e only government
respons e to speech imp ervious to lega l review .
Damag es actions und er Section 1983 carry self-evid ent det errent
valu e. Beca use an elect ed body will, in all likelihood , hav e completed
what ever decision was ongoing at th e time a speaker lost th e ability to
be hea rd , and th e courts will not compel a "do-o ver " of a completed
decision , after-the-fact recomp ens e m ay be th e only rem edy left for a
speaker wrongfull y excluded from a governm ent forum.
CONCL U SION

Locall y elected officials regularly trespass into constitutionally
protec t ed territory in t he name of main ta ining decorum and civility at
government meetings . Policie s that forbid mentioning proper names or
ot herwise impermissibl y re strict speech are common. The se policies
reflect an in adequate appreciation for the fractious me ssiness of
participator y democracy. As the Supreme Court memorably opined in
striking down re striction s on politic al speech in public schools :
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough
to overcome the right to freedom of expression . Any departure
from absolute regimentation may cause trouble . Any variation
from th e majority 's opinion may inspir e fear. Any word spoken ,
in class , in the lunchroom , or on the campus , that deviat es from
the views of anoth er person may start an argum ent or cause a
disturb ance. But our Constitution says we must take this
risk ... and our history says that it is this sort of hazardou s
freedom- this kind of openness- that is the basis of our nat ional
stre ngth and of the independ ence and vigor of Americans who
grow up and live in this relat ively permissive, often disput at ious,
society. 272
The most troubling situations are those like Fane Lozman 's-on es
in which a commenter's refusal to refrain from irrelevant remarks
escalates into a confrontation on the grounds of defiance of the chair's
ins tructions. "Irrelevance" alone should never be grounds for an

271. Ru ta n v . Republic an Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 75 n .8 (1990) (quoting
Ru ta n v. Republican Party of 111., 868 F .2d 944, 954 n .4 (7th Cir. 1989)).
272. Tink er v. Des Moines Ind ep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508- 09 (1969).
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arrest, 273 so it is difficult to see how even a full thr ee minut es of refusing
to refrain from irr elevancy could be a criminally punishable disturbanc e.
Irr elevant speech is not constitutionally unprotect ed , and a speaker 's
failur e to conform to the chair's relevancy st andards , without more
(such as shouting or oth er defiant behavior) should never be sufficient
to sustain a criminal conviction. Giv en the apparent confusion over how
heav ily citizen commenters may be restrict ed , clea r guidance from th e
Supr eme Court in Bartlett or a future case about the level of protection
afforded to speech at local-gov ernm ent m eetings is badl y needed .
As a practic al m atter , managing the use of open-mic periods is often
as simple as developing a thick er skin and strictly enforcing adh erenc e
to content-neutral time limits . Lo zman illustrat es how an unwillingness
to tol era t e disagr eea ble but harml ess speech can its elf disrupt a public
m eeting far more than the speech itself could have . Wh en Fan e Lozman
was silenced by th e chair of th e city council , he was describing
corruption charges brought against a former commissioner for the
county that encompass es Rivi era Beach. 274 Th e comments were
qu estionably relevant to any issue befor e the city council or within th e
city council's jurisdiction , but if Lozman was pr eparing to connect his
story to the matter before the council, he was not given th at chance.
Had th e council simply "tun ed out " th e irr elevanci es and allowed
Lozman 's time to expir e without incident , a doz en years of federal
litigation could hav e been averted and, in turn , countless taxpayer
dollars saved . Ultimately , even if courts dev elop a coherent consensus
regarding wh en citizens can permissibly be stifled at government
m eetings , the onus rests squarely on government officials to heed those
rules and , in th e proc ess, to recogni ze th e importanc e of the First
Amendm ent rights of both free speech and petition in a self-governing
democracy .

273. See White v. City of Norw alk, 900 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990)
(recognizing that "imp ertin ent " speech may be regar ded as unprot ect ed
only if accompanied by di sru pt ive condu ct).
274. S ee Lozman v . City of Rivi era Beach , 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1949 (2018) ("He
bega n to di scus s the recent arr est of a former county official.
Councilmember Wade inte rrupted Lozman, directing him to stop making
those remar ks. Lozm an continu ed speaking , this tim e about th e arr est of
a former official from th e city of W est Palm Beach. ") .
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